

Explaining the Vote for Sub-State Nationalist Parties:
The SNP and the Bloc Québécois Compared

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Introduction

Over the past 40 years, scholars have sought to understand the protean phenomenon of nationalism, in all of its various guises. A broad range of theoretical perspectives have been brought to bear, ranging from structural, functional, and culturalist approaches to rational choice and institutionalism. A notable lacuna in this literature is the comparative analysis of the electoral manifestations of sub-state nationalism. While there is an accumulating body of research on voting for nationalist parties in particular countries, there has been little attempt to compare the correlates of support for these parties across countries. Instead, the focus has tended to be on the distinctiveness of the parties within their respective party systems.

In this paper, we start to address this gap by undertaking a systematic comparison of voting for the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Bloc Québécois. Our purpose is twofold. On the one hand, we want to see if a comparative analysis can enhance our understanding of why some Scots and francophone Quebecers are drawn to these parties, while others are not. The focus here is very much on the inter-party dynamics of support. On the other hand, we want to assess the usefulness of a variety of theoretical perspectives on the rise of sub-state nationalism for explaining behaviour at the ballot box. Our data are taken from the 1997 Scottish Election Study and the 1997 Canadian Election Study.

Context

We cannot undertake this analysis without first drawing attention to some of the more salient differences between the two parties. The Bloc has a shorter history than the SNP, but in the brief span of its existence, it has achieved much greater electoral success (Figure 1). Part of the explanation has to lie in the fact that it did not have to begin the task of mobilizing electoral support from scratch. Modern Quebec nationalism first found electoral expression in voting for the Parti Québécois (PQ) in provincial elections, and the Bloc was able to capitalize on the achievements of its provincial counterpart. The PQ grew rapidly from its beginnings in the late-1960's to win its first provincial election in 1976. However, it was not until 1990 that an avowedly separatist party sought to emulate the PQ's success in the federal arena. It was not as though nationalists in Quebec did not see value in the concept of a federally constituted separatist party, but a number of conditions had to come together to make it happen. As Crête and Lachapelle (2001) note, these included the overall context of federal and constitutional politics, the advent of a suitable federal leader and the presence of popular support within the nationalist community in Quebec for a sovereignist party at the federal level. Thus, the Bloc developed out of a unique set of circumstances and conditions in Canadian politics.

[Figure 1 about here]

The failure to resolve the constitutional crisis loomed large. In 1982, under the leadership of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Canada had patriated the constitution. This had gone ahead without the formal approval of the Government of Quebec and despite the concerns voiced about the terms of the amending formulae and the constraints on Quebec's ability to chart divergent policy paths from the rest of Canada. Voters in Quebec (separatists and federalists alike) felt betrayed by the actions of Trudeau and the Liberal government in Ottawa. In the 1984 federal election, nationalist voters chose to support the Progressive Conservative Party led by Brian Mulroney. This was due, in large part, to a famous speech (written by Lucien Bouchard, the

future BQ leader) in which Mulroney pledged that under a Conservative government, Quebec would be brought into the constitution of Canada with “honour and enthusiasm”. The culmination of Mulroney’s promise was the Meech Lake Accord reached by the heads of government of all provinces and the federal government. Central to Quebec’s agreement to the terms of the Meech Lake constitutional package were the recognition of Quebec as a “distinct society” and various provisions designed to enhance the power and autonomy of the Quebec government within Canada. For a variety of reasons (all of which are well beyond the scope this paper), the Meech Lake Accord did not receive the necessary ratification and so in 1990 it effectively died.

The impact of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord on the creation of the Bloc cannot be overstated. Francophone Quebecers (nationalists and federalists alike) felt that their constitutional vision of Canada, and of Quebec’s place within it, had been rejected. There was a strong sense that Quebecers needed a party in the federal sphere to properly articulate the interests, concerns and demands of Quebec. Lucien Bouchard emerged to lead the new party. A former minister in Mulroney’s cabinet, he had resigned in bitter frustration. As the Bloc’s first leader, he served as a charismatic champion of the feeling of rejection and frustration that many Quebecers felt after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. As Crête and Lachapelle (2001) argue, Bouchard was crucial to the crystallization of popular sentiment in favour of the Bloc’s creation.

The Bloc achieved a spectacular breakthrough in the 1993 federal election. Thanks to the concentrated nature of its support and the workings of the single member plurality system, its 49 percent share of the Quebec vote translated into 54 out of 75 seats. With the advent of a five-party system and the total electoral collapse of the Conservatives, this proved to be enough for the party to emerge as the Official Opposition in Ottawa. Under the leadership of Gilles Duceppe, the Bloc’s vote share in Quebec fell to 38 percent in the 1997 federal election, but it rebounded to 40 percent in the 2000 election.

The Scottish National Party has had a very different electoral evolution (Figure 2). The party was created in April of 1934 when the National Party of Scotland (NPS) merged with the Scottish Party (SP). While the SP was somewhat more moderate in its nationalist positions than the NPS, the merger was effected as a way of expanding the potential appeal of a nationalist electoral option in Scotland (Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998). From an early point in its existence, the key policy position of the SNP has been the establishment of a Scottish Parliament with “home rule” for all matters of import to Scotland, and this was to be achieved through democratic and peaceful means (Pittock, 2001).

[Figure 2 about here]

In terms of electoral achievement, the SNP has experienced limited success. Prior to 1970, the SNP won no more than 5 percent of the votes cast in any one British General Election (all election statistics drawn from Hassan and Lynch, 2001). However, the SNP rose quickly in the early 1970’s to a vote share high of 30.4 percent in the October, 1974 election. Following the referendum loss in 1979 on the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, the SNP’s vote share dropped precipitously and bottomed out in 1983 at just below 12 percent. The party has since

recovered and now regularly wins just above 20 percent of the popular vote in Scotland. In spite of its not inconsequential electoral support, even at its peak in the October 1974 election, the SNP has never managed to elect more than 11 Members of Parliament to Westminster. In the 2001 General Election, the SNP won 20.1 percent of the vote but only 5 seats. Like the Bloc, the SNP contests general elections under the single member plurality electoral system. The difference is that the electoral system has worked to the Bloc's advantage because its support is concentrated in predominantly francophone constituencies (Massicotte and Blais 1999). This has meant that it has consistently won more seats than its share of the vote would otherwise warrant. The SNP's support, on the other hand, is evenly dispersed and it has failed to reach the critical mass that it would allow it to translate more of its votes into seats.

Theoretical Perspectives

The SNP and the Bloc operate in very different political contexts, and this is reflected in their vote shares. What interests us is whether voting for these two disparate parties can nonetheless be explained within a common theoretical perspective. An obvious place to start is with the work of Michael Hechter (1975). Rooted in the failure of diffusionist theory to account for the rise of nationalism in Europe, Hechter sought to develop an explanatory account of nationalism predicated upon a combination of structuralism and economic rationality. As he stated in revisiting his thesis ten years later; "the central theoretical claim of the book was that the survival of nationalism ultimately depended on the existence of a cultural division of labour—a stratification system giving cultural distinctions political salience by systematically linking them to individual life chances" (Hechter, 1985, 18). A cultural division of labour is understood to exist when, in the presence of other distinct cultures, one culture monopolizes the elite and skilled positions of society (Rogowski, 1985). According to this account, national identity develops out of the rational consideration of one's life chances as a member of a particular cultural group. Individuals can be expected to adopt a nationalist identity when they come to see that they share vital economic interests with other members of the cultural collectivity (Hechter, 1985).

A critical ingredient in the development of a nationalist identity is thus the perception that one's own culture/region is doing less well economically than other cultures/regions in the country. Extrapolating from this, we could hypothesize that the stronger people's sense that their national collectivity is doing less well economically/materially than other regions (or the country as a whole), the greater their likelihood of supporting a nationalist party. The development of a nationalist identity becomes a key mediating variable in this account. As Brand (1987, 341) notes, "When residents of the culturally distinctive periphery perceive [these differences], national identity will become more salient and the nationalist vote will rise."

On the other hand, when we employ an explicitly rational choice approach, what matters more is the individual's *prospective* cost-benefit analysis of the independence option. Based on Rogowski's (1985, 87) rationalist assumptions, "nationalism is: 1) the product of value-maximizing (but not merely greedy) behaviour; and 2) based almost always on an accurate appraisal of self-interest and social reality (that is, rarely a consequence of hysteria or delusion)." From this perspective, "nationalism is always rational...[in that it is] embraced by the given individual because, and to the extent that, it offers him a greater net benefit than do other possible investments of effort" (Rogowski 1985, 88). Linking this line of argument to voting for

nationalist parties, we can hypothesize that people will be more likely to vote for parties like the SNP or the Bloc to the extent that they *anticipate* a net economic benefit to themselves under the potential future condition of constitutional independence espoused by these parties.

Before proceeding further, it is important to highlight the distinction between Hechter's approach and an explicitly rationalist one. Hechter's analysis is not necessarily incompatible with the rationalist theory. Indeed, his theory has rationalist underpinnings, and the two theories have been employed in complementary fashion to examine voting for the SNP (Brand, Mitchell and Surrige 1994). However, we believe that it is important to maintain a distinction between the two. On the one hand, Hechter's analysis is distinctive in the central place that it accords to national identity. Indeed, his purpose was to account for the emergence of such an identity. If his theory is to be extended to nationalist voting, we need to see whether national identity provides the critical link in connecting a sense of relative deprivation to a vote for a nationalist party. On the other hand, the rationalist theory has a prospective cost-benefit component linked to independence that is clearly missing from Hechter's theory. Thus, we believe that there is value in treating the rationalist approach as analytically and causally distinct from Hechter's perspective in understanding the motivation to vote for nationalist parties.

What is lacking in both theories is a consideration of the dynamics of nationalist mobilization. How do voters come to share the political goals of sub-state nationalist parties? Mughan and McAllister (1981) have pointed to the role of nationalist leaders in mobilizing support for nationalist parties. A sense of regional deprivation, for example, is unlikely to emerge spontaneously. It needs to be nurtured by community leaders. Similarly, leaders are needed to galvanize a sense of national identity and cultural awareness, and to encourage voters to perceive the costs and benefits of independence in a positive light. This all suggests that leaders may be an integral component of the decision-matrix when it comes to voting for a nationalist party. While a focus on leadership is quite compatible with a rationalist perspective in which nationalist leaders attempt to mobilize support for independence as a result of their own cost-benefit analysis of future self-gain in an autonomous Quebec or Scotland, we take the position that one does not have to assume such a calculus to appreciate the potential importance of the party leader's influence on individual vote choice. As such, the essential hypothesis that flows from a theoretical focus on leadership is that evaluations of the party leader will be more consequential for the nationalist party's vote than they are for the vote of the other parties.

In addition to testing hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature on the rise of sub-state nationalism, we also want to compare the social structural bases of the nationalist vote. Do the SNP and the Bloc appeal—or not—to similar sorts of voters? This can tell us something about the dynamics of inter-party competition, and thus the strategic challenges faced by the two parties.

Data and Methods

Testing the various hypotheses requires a strategy that takes account of the fact that some variables are causally prior to others. If we enter all of the potential explanatory variables into a single equation, we risk under-estimating the impact of causally prior variables. Social structural variables like age and social class, for example, may affect the vote directly, but they may also have an indirect effect by influencing more proximate factors like perceptions of relative

deprivation and constitutional preferences. Using a single equation to estimate the effects of all of the variables simultaneously would give us only the direct, or unmediated, effects of the social structural variables.

Accordingly, we use a ‘bloc recursive’ approach to model vote choice (Miller and Shanks 1996; Blais et al. forthcoming). This approach enables us to estimate both the total effects and the direct effects of causally prior variables. It involves identifying blocs of variables that are entered sequentially into the regression analyses, starting with the most causally distant variables (see Figure 3).¹ At the farthest remove are a variety of social structural variables that could potentially shape voters’ choice of party. These include sex, age, education, income, housing tenure (Scotland only), social class, union membership, and religion. Next, we enter a measure of relative deprivation, reflecting voters’ perceptions of whether they are faring worse *as a collectivity* than other parts of the country. According to the internal colonialism model, it is this sense of relative deprivation that fosters a distinctive national identity. Accordingly, a measure of national identity is included in the next bloc of variables. This bloc also includes class identity (Scotland only) and ideological orientations, variables that have been linked in the literature to the cultural distinctiveness of the respective collectivities (see, for example, Brown et al. 1999; Blais et al. 2002). Next comes a measure of rationalist calculation. This corresponds to the suggestion that a sense of relative deprivation may not be sufficient (or even necessary): what is required is a perception that the voter will be better off under a new constitutional arrangement (Mughan and McAllister 1987; Brand, Mitchell and Surridge 1994). The constitutional preference itself follows logically as the next explanatory factor to be added to the model. Finally, leader ratings are added to tap into the possible mobilizing effects of the nationalist leadership.

[Figure 3 about here]

All of the estimations are based on conditional logistic regression. This enables us to model the vote as a multinomial choice, while simultaneously allowing for both individual-specific and choice-specific effects. With only individual-specific variables (like social background characteristics and attitudinal variables) included in the model, conditional logistic regression leads to the same results as multinomial logistic regression. In that case, it is equivalent to modelling the choice between pairs of parties using a series of binomial logistic regressions. The difference is that it performs the estimations more efficiently (Alvarez and Nagler 1998).²

It is important to underline how this differs from a strategy of simply modelling the vote as a choice between the SNP, say, and the other three parties combined. While the latter may be appropriate for some purposes, it provides little insight into the “multifaceted process of choosing among multiple parties at once” (Whitten and Palmer 1996). The advantage of our approach is that it highlights the inter-party dynamics of support. Imagine a variable—say, housing tenure—that could plausibly make a Labour vote more likely while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of a vote for the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats. If the vote was modelled as a choice between the SNP and the other three parties, these effects would cancel one another out and we would conclude—wrongly—that housing tenure was not a factor in SNP voting. Another benefit of modelling the vote as a multinomial choice (or as a series of binomial

choices) is that it allows for different variables to play into different sets of choices. Take a variable like religion. Being Catholic may be very relevant to the choice between Labour and the SNP, but count for little when the choice is between the SNP and the Conservatives. Collapsing the choice into one between the SNP and the other parties would necessarily mute this effect.

Where conditional logistic regression differs from multinomial logistic regression is in its ability to incorporate choice-specific effects. We treat leader evaluations as choice-specific variables. The assumption is that the effects of any given leader's evaluations will be the same for all choices. This makes sense: the more negatively the leader is rated, the lower the odds of choosing his party over another. However, our specification does allow for some leaders to have consistently stronger effects than others. The salience of leadership is thus viewed as a characteristic of the party. As Alvarez and Nagler (1998, 56) put it, "conditional logit is 'conditional on the characteristics of the choices'."

The coefficients estimated by conditional logit lack a straightforward interpretation. They represent the predicted marginal impact of a given independent variable on the log-odds of choosing a given party relative to a baseline party. Their meaning depends on the values of the other variables included in the model. However, they enable us to estimate the independent impact of each variable on the probability of voting for any given party. Take sex, for example. On the basis of the estimations, we can compute the mean probability of voting SNP, first if everyone were female and, second if everyone were male, keeping the effects of the other social background characteristics unchanged. The difference in the mean probabilities gives us an estimate of the average impact of sex on voting SNP, everything else being equal.

The data are taken from the 1997 Scottish Election Study³ and the 1997 Canadian Election Study.⁴ There were not enough voters who supported smaller parties in either election to allow reliable generalizations about them. Accordingly, our analysis is confined to those who voted Bloc Québécois, Liberal or Conservative in Quebec, and SNP, Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat in Scotland. In the case of Quebec, the analysis is restricted to francophones since only a trivial number of non-francophones votes for the separatist party (Nevitte et al. 2000). However, we have erred on the side of inclusiveness in defining francophones in order to include those who have assimilated to the francophone milieu, even if their first language is not French. Any Quebec resident who had French as a first language, spoke French at home, or was surveyed in French was counted as a francophone.

Age, income, and education⁵ were all entered as continuous variables. The remaining social background characteristics were entered as a series of dummy variables, with the named category coded '1'. Following SurrIDGE and her colleagues (1999), social class was represented by five occupational categories: routine non-manual, petty bourgeoisie, manual foremen, and working class, with the salariat as the reference category. A sixth category was added to accommodate those who could not be classified (c.f. Brown et al. 1999). This category was larger in Quebec (30%) because the 1997 Canadian Election Study did not obtain information on the former occupation of respondents who were retired. 'Foremen' could not be used as a separate category in Quebec since only seven respondents listed this as their occupation. Two other differences should be noted. First, in Quebec there is no equivalent to the public housing variable, and, second, the francophone population in Quebec is so heavily Catholic that it does not make sense to include religious denomination as a variable. The more meaningful

consideration in Quebec is whether someone has a religion or not. Finally, the Canadian Election Study asked whether anyone in the respondent's household was a union member. Accordingly, for Scotland as well, the union category is based on the respondent and/or the respondent's household.

Relative deprivation is represented by voters' perceptions of whether Scotland had been getting more or less prosperous than average since the previous general election. For Quebec, a surrogate measure had to be constructed, based on the difference between respondents' perceptions of how the Quebec economy had been faring over the previous year and how the Canadian economy had been faring.

Similarly, a measure of Quebec identity had to be approximated by comparing Quebecers' feelings about Quebec with their feelings about Canada. While this might be considered more a measure of attachment than identity *per se*, it has usefully been employed to represent the affective dimension in studies of the correlates of support for sovereignty. Indeed, Blais and Nadeau (1992) explicitly equate "how one feels about Quebec and Canada" with "one's sense of collective identity" (see also Martin 1994; Howe 1998). A left-right scale and a libertarianism-authoritarianism scale were included to tap basic beliefs and values. In the Scottish case, the scales were both taken directly from prior studies (Heath, Evans, and Martin 1993; Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996; Norris and Evans 1999). Similar scales were then constructed for the Quebec sample.⁶ Details of scale reliabilities can be found in Appendix B. No measure of working class identity is available for Quebec. Class voting has been notoriously weak in the Canadian setting (see Gidengil 2002) and prior research has demonstrated convincingly that many Canadians either have difficulty understanding class labels or else find them irrelevant to their own situation. Pammett's (1987) evidence on this score is particularly compelling. Based on a panel study, he found that only 3 percent of Canadians maintained a spontaneous working-class identification when interviewed in 1974 and re-interviewed in 1979.

Rationalist calculations in Scotland are represented by the predicted economic consequences of having a Scottish parliament, while the Quebec scenario refers to the respondent's standard of living, should Quebec separate from Canada.⁷ For Scotland, the possible constitutional preferences run from Scotland becoming completely independent to Scotland remaining part of the United Kingdom, without an elected parliament. For Quebec, the question relates to views about Quebec sovereignty, "that is, Quebec is no longer a part of Canada."⁸

The final variables to be included are the evaluations of each of the party leaders. The Scottish Election Study asked respondents to rate the party leaders on a 0 to 10 scale, while the Canadian Election Study employed a 0 to 100 scale. To enhance comparability, the Quebec ratings were collapsed into 11 categories.

All of the attitudinal variables have been recoded to run from -1 to +1, with 0 corresponding to the middle category. While the variables have been chosen so as to be as similar as possible in the two national settings, there are differences that make it unwise to compare the absolute size of effects. What interests us, however, is a comparison of the relative effects.

Findings

In Scotland and Quebec alike, age is clearly a factor in voting for nationalist parties (Table 1). In Scotland, though, it only plays into the choice between the SNP, on the one hand, and the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats, on the other. In both cases, the older voters are, the lower their odds of choosing the SNP over the other two parties. Meanwhile, age has no effect on the odds of choosing the SNP over Labour. As a result, the overall impact of age on SNP voting is rather modest. Other things being equal, the probability of voting SNP was only about two points higher among voters in their twenties than it was among voters in their sixties. In Quebec, by contrast, the probability of a Bloc vote was 19 points higher among voters in their twenties than it was among voters in their sixties. This reflects the fact that age was a significant factor, whether the choice was between the Bloc and the Liberals or between the Bloc and the Conservatives. And, in both cases, being older reduced the odds of a voter crossing the Bloc.

[Table 1 about here]

Conversely, belonging to a union household increases the probability of a Bloc vote by 18 percentage points, but has only a trivial impact on the probability of voting SNP. Again, the difference is that in Quebec union membership affects the choice between the Bloc and both the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, whereas in Scotland its effect is limited to the choice between the SNP and the Conservatives. The main beneficiary of union voting in Scotland, not surprisingly, is the Labour Party and it benefits mainly at the expense of the Conservatives.

Indeed, what is striking in the case of Scotland is how little there is to distinguish between Labour voters and SNP voters when it comes to social background characteristics. The one characteristic that does matter is religion. Catholics are much less likely to choose the SNP over the Labour Party. Other things being equal, being Catholic reduces the probability of an SNP vote by 15 points (and increases the probability of a Labour vote by twenty-eight points).

None of the class-related variables have any significant effect on the choice between the SNP and the Labour Party, confirming that both parties are appealing to the same class constituency (albeit with markedly different success). Where class-related variables do seem to matter is in the choice between the SNP and the other two parties. Living in local authority housing, for example, significantly enhances the odds of voting SNP over both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Overall, the propensity to vote SNP was 8 points higher among people living in council housing. So, too, though, was the propensity to vote Labour. As for being working class, it may have enhanced the odds of choosing the SNP over the Conservatives, but overall, it made little difference to the probability of an SNP vote (other things being equal).

In Quebec, meanwhile, class-related variables had very little effect. The one exception was income, and then only when it came to the choice between the Bloc and the Conservatives. Having a higher income reduced the odds of choosing the Bloc over the Conservatives. Overall, the probability of voting Bloc was 11 points higher among those with a household income of \$100,000 or more than it was among those with a household income of under \$20,000. Besides income, age and union membership were the only other social background characteristics that distinguished Bloc voters from the rest.

Social structure is clearly more of a factor in voting for the SNP. In addition to age, union membership, religion, public housing and social class, sex and education both played a role, at least when it came to the choice between the SNP and the Liberal Democrats. Being a woman and having more schooling both reduced the odds of choosing the SNP over the Liberal Democrats. Other things being equal, the probability of voting SNP was 6 points lower for women than for men and 4 points lower for university graduates than for those who left school without O levels.

[Table 2 about here]

Social structure clearly explains more of the variation in nationalist voting in Scotland than it does in Quebec. Perceptions of relative deprivation, meanwhile, matter in both settings, but in quite opposite ways (Table 2). In the case of Scotland, the effect of these perceptions is consistent with theoretical expectations: the odds of choosing the SNP over any of the other parties are significantly enhanced by the perception that Scotland is faring worse than other parts of Britain. The effect is strongest for the choice between the SNP and the Conservatives and weakest for the choice between the SNP and Labour. Holding social background characteristics constant, the probability of voting SNP is 13 points higher when someone perceives that Scotland has been getting a lot less prosperous than when someone perceives no difference between Scotland and the rest of Britain. Labour also benefits from this perception, but much more modestly (3 points higher).

In Quebec, by contrast, the perception that the Quebec economy has been faring worse than the Canadian economy as a whole actually works to diminish the odds of a Bloc vote, especially vis-à-vis the incumbent Liberals. Other things being equal, the probability of voting Bloc is 26 points lower when someone perceives that the Quebec economy is doing much worse than the Canadian economy in general, compared with someone who perceives no difference. This suggests that economic fearfulness is a significant brake on support for the Bloc. It also helps to explain the age effect. When relative deprivation is added to the model, the age effect ceases to be significant for the choice between the Bloc and the Liberal Party.

Our indicators of relative deprivation are far from ideal, given that they both measure perceptions of relative disadvantage over rather a short time frame. Conceptually, a feeling of relative deprivation should be a prerequisite for the emergence of a distinctive national identity in the peripheral territory. Empirically, though, our measure makes the direction of causality a murkier question. Bennie and her colleagues (1997, 129) have raised a similar concern, but like us, they opt to treat relative deprivation as a precursor of the development of a Scottish identity. It turns out, though, that the impact of relative deprivation on voting for the SNP is very similar, whether national identity is included in the model or not (see Appendix A). Indeed, it persists even when rationalist calculations and constitutional preferences are added. The effect, in short, is mostly direct and unmediated. This is also true of its—quite opposite—effect on Bloc voting in Quebec, at least when it comes to the choice between the Bloc and the incumbent Liberals.

The impact of identity is clear and consistent in Scotland and Quebec alike, with one notable exception. Having a Scottish, as opposed to a British, identity does *not* significantly enhance the odds of choosing the SNP over Labour. Clearly, the SNP is competing with Labour,

not just for the same class constituency, but also for the same nationalist constituency. Only when the choice is between the SNP, on the one hand, and the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, does a Scottish identity significantly enhance the odds of a nationalist vote. This is why the overall impact of national identity on the propensity to vote SNP ends up being rather modest. Other things being equal, the probability of voting SNP is nine points higher if someone identifies him/herself as being ‘Scottish, not British’, as opposed to being ‘equally Scottish and British.’

In Quebec, by contrast, the Bloc is the clear winner in the identity stakes. The stronger a voter’s sense of attachment to Quebec, relative to Canada, the greater the odds of a Bloc vote. The impact of identity is particularly powerful when it comes to the choice between the Bloc and the stronger of the two federalist parties in Quebec (the Liberals). Other things being equal, the probability of a Bloc vote was 39 points higher when a voter rated Quebec 25 points higher than Canada on a 0 to 100 feeling thermometer, compared with a voter who rated them both the same (as 30 percent of voters did). And 25 percent of voters did rate Quebec higher than Canada by a margin of 25 *or more*. As noted above, the indicators of identity in Scotland and Quebec are not directly comparable. Still, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that national identity plays a much stronger role in nationalist voting in Quebec than it does in Scotland.

Ideology is clearly a factor in nationalist voting in both settings. In Quebec, though, it is only left-right beliefs that matter. The more right wing the voter’s beliefs, the lower the odds of choosing the Bloc over either of the federalist parties. Other things being equal, the probability of voting for the Bloc is 19 points lower when a voter receives the maximum score on the left-right scale, compared with a voter who scores in the middle.

The Scottish story is, again, more complicated. Left-right beliefs clearly influence the choice between the SNP and the Conservatives. The further to the right voters are, the lower their odds of opting for the SNP over the Conservatives. Left-right beliefs also influence the choice between the SNP and Labour, but now the odds of choosing the SNP improve when voters score higher on the left-right scale. The probability of voting SNP (other things being equal) is thus higher when voters score in the middle of the scale than when they score either very low (i.e. very left-wing) or very high (i.e. very right-wing). When it comes to left-right beliefs, SNP voters come between Labour voters and Conservative voters, though closer to the former than to the latter.

In contrast to Quebec, libertarian-authoritarian beliefs also affect nationalist voting. This time, the story is straightforward. Libertarian beliefs significantly enhance the odds of voting SNP over the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats alike. Other things being equal, the probability of voting SNP is 21 points higher when a voter receives the lowest score on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (i.e. very libertarian), compared with a voter who scores in the middle.

Finally, there is a non-finding for Scotland. Working class identity does not significantly affect the choice of party, once national identity and ideological beliefs are taken into account.

This brings us to rationalist calculations and constitutional preferences. The findings here are consistent and unambiguous. In Scotland and Quebec alike, thinking that things would improve under a new constitutional arrangement significantly enhanced the odds of choosing the nationalist party over any one of the others. Other things being equal, the probability of a Bloc vote increased by 29 points if voters believed that their standard of living would get a lot better were Quebec to separate from Canada, compared with voters who thought that it would make no difference. Meanwhile, in Scotland, thinking that the economy would get a lot better with a Scottish parliament increased the probability of an SNP vote by 21 points, compared with thinking it would make no difference. There are two things to note about this effect, and they are related. First, rationalist calculations are more important than any sense of relative deprivation, and second, rationalist calculations do nothing to encourage a Labour vote. If there is a factor (aside from religion) that serves to differentiate SNP voters from Labour voters, it is calculations of the economic benefits of constitutional change (c.f. Brand, Mitchell and Surridge 1994).

The other factor that distinguishes the SNP vote is constitutional preference. Everything else being equal, the probability of voting SNP is 40 points higher when voters favour complete independence for Scotland, compared with voters who favour an elected parliament which has some taxation powers. The more radical the constitutional preference, the greater the odds of choosing the SNP over any of the other parties. Similarly, in Quebec, the more voters favour the sovereigntist option, the greater their odds of voting for the Bloc rather than either of the two federalist parties. Other things being equal, the probability of voting for the Bloc is 30 points higher when voters are very favourable to Quebec sovereignty than when they are indifferent.

[Table 3 about here]

Leadership had a powerful impact on voting for all of the parties in both Scotland and Quebec (Table 3). Contrary to expectations, however, the impact of leadership was not strongest for the nationalist party in either setting. In Scotland, leadership mattered most to Liberal Democrat voting, while in Quebec, it was Conservative voting that was most strongly influenced by evaluations of the party's leader. It could be that leadership is a critical factor in a nationalist party's initial success, but then assumes more typical proportions. Certainly, the strongest leader effect registered in the 1993 Canadian election was for Bouchard and the Bloc (Clarke, Kornberg and Wearing 2000, 142). Another possibility is the 'positivity effect' whereby positive feelings about a leader may be more important when it comes to voting for a party than negative feelings (Wattenberg 1991, 150). Certainly, this would fit conceptually with the notion that leadership has a mobilizing effect, but for now it must await further study.

Discussion

Despite the very different electoral trajectories of the SNP and the Bloc and despite the differences in the political contexts in which they operate, there are some similarities in the factors that motivate a vote for these two nationalist parties. One of the more interesting is the importance of left-right beliefs. As Brown and her colleagues (1999, 83) observe, "in Scotland the SNP have promoted both Scottish identity and left-wing values thereby creating a link between the two in the mass public." Brown and her colleagues characterize this as a case of elite discourse shaping public opinion, leading to "a situation in which to say one is Scottish is also to say one has left-wing views" (p. 91). They argue that this linking of left-wing values with

Scottish nationalism was a strategic imperative for the SNP if it was to compete successfully with Labour for votes. There is, they conclude, “no necessary link between left-wing views and Scottish nationalism” (p. 78). Yet we see the very same linkage in Quebec where the Bloc faced a quite different strategic context. It is beyond the scope of this paper to probe the reasons why, but it may not be surprising that a nationalist party that aspires to independent statehood should seek to promote collectivist values and to underline the importance of the state and public provision.

One of the most striking differences in the correlates of support for the SNP and the Bloc, meanwhile, is the role of perceptions of relative deprivation. Mughan and McAllister (1981, 189-90) have concluded that “The ‘internal colonial’ model...does little to help us understand the recent and widespread politicization of [ethnic] consciousness.” This conclusion certainly holds when it comes to explaining the Bloc vote. If anything, the perception that Quebec was faring worse than Canada as a whole discouraged a vote for the Bloc. However, in contrast to previous studies, we do find a “direct and straightforward relationship between a sense of relative deprivation and nationalist party voting” (Mughan and McAllister 1981, 194) in Scotland. True, this perception does not sharply differentiate SNP voters from Labour voters, but overall it does enhance the probability of a nationalist vote, and the effect was direct and unmediated. The impact of relative deprivation was not contingent on a perception that the collectivity would fare better under a new political arrangement nor was it linked to the vote via a sense of national identity.

This is not to downplay the importance of prospective cost-benefit calculations in voting for nationalist parties. Indeed, these calculations outweighed perceptions of relative deprivation in their impact on voting for the SNP, as well as the Bloc. There is clear support here for the notion that rationalist calculations are a significant factor in voting for nationalist parties (Mughan and McAllister 1981; Brand, Mitchell and SurrIDGE 1994). Voting for both the SNP and the Bloc was significantly enhanced when voters believed that they would be better off with a new political arrangement.

National identity, on the other hand, was clearly a more important factor in voting for the Bloc than it was in voting for the SNP. Not surprisingly, much of the impact of Quebec identity was mediated by more proximate factors. However, Quebec identity continued to have a significant independent impact on Bloc voting, over and above both rationalist calculations and support for sovereignty. In a very real sense, then, a Bloc vote is an expression of national identity. This contrasts with the situation in Scotland. Not only was the impact of identity demonstrably weaker in Scotland, but that impact was mostly indirect. Once cost-benefit calculations were added to the model, identity ceased to have a significant effect on voting for the SNP. Voting for the Bloc, on the other hand, seems to hinge at least as much on Quebecers’ sense of collective identity as on any rational calculus of the benefits and costs of a new political arrangement. Quebecers, it seems, may be more willing than their Scottish counterparts to let cultural considerations trump economic ones. Still, we should not underestimate the potential importance of prospective cost-benefit calculations. As Nadeau and his colleagues (1999, 525) note with respect to voting in the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, “National identification is a crucial predisposition that tends to orient the decision calculus of Quebecers, but it does not eliminate the more instrumental dimension of the choice.”

One possible explanation for why Scottish identity does not play a stronger role in SNP voting is that national identity has to compete with class interests in Scotland. As Bennie and her colleagues (1997) note, “From 1989 onward, Labour and the SNP [have] attempted to outbid each other as protectors of working-class and Scottish interests.” In this respect, it is telling that Scottish identity did not enhance the odds of a voter choosing the SNP over Labour in the 1997 election. In Quebec, by contrast, class-related factors have not figured significantly in vote choice. And in Quebec there is another powerful force at work: Quebec identity is closely bound up with language. Lacking a similar cultural foundation, national identity in Scotland has often taken a back seat to class (Brand 1987). This simple but fundamental difference may go a long way to explaining the very different electoral fortunes of the Bloc and the SNP

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Appendix A1: Factors Affecting the Odds of Voting for the Bloc versus the Liberal Party

	Social Structure	Relative Deprivation	Identities & Values	Rationalist Calculations	Constitutional Preferences	Leaders
Female	-0.17 (.23)	-0.27 (.24)	-0.47 (.31)	-0.50 (.33)	-0.46 (.38)	-0.75 (.50)
Age	-0.02 (.01)*	-0.01 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	+0.00 (.01)	+0.00 (.02)	+0.01 (.02)
Education	+0.07 (.13)	+0.20 (.14)	+0.24 (.19)	+0.17 (.20)	+0.06 (.23)	+0.09 (.29)
Income	-0.01 (.05)	+0.01 (.05)	-0.01 (.06)	+0.02 (.07)	-0.02 (.08)	-0.03 (.10)
Working class	+0.24 (.39)	+0.25 (.40)	+0.35 (.53)	+0.40 (.57)	+0.53 (.64)	+0.80 (.84)
Routine	-0.37 (.35)	-0.43 (.36)	-0.44 (.47)	-0.05 (.52)	-0.01 (.59)	-0.40 (.76)
Petit bourgeois	-0.33 (.79)	+0.08 (.83)	+1.29 (.98)	+0.30 (.97)	+1.49 (1.34)	+1.04 (1.49)
No code	+0.18 (.34)	+0.12 (.35)	+0.40 (.46)	+0.16 (.48)	+0.22 (.55)	+0.02 (.73)
Union household	+0.87 (.24)***	+0.89 (.25)***	+0.58 (.32) ^a	+0.39 (.34)	+0.36 (.39)	-0.39 (.51)
No religion	-0.61 (.45)	-0.74 (.47)	-0.67 (.61)	-0.96 (.64)	-0.94 (.73)	-1.76 (.87)*
Relative deprivation		-1.61 (.30)***	-1.51 (.39)***	-1.23 (.43)**	-1.44 (.47)**	-1.72 (.63)**
Quebec identity			+9.71 (1.06)***	+7.57 (1.03)***	+4.82 (1.06)***	+3.35 (1.37)**
Left-right			-1.61 (.63)**	-1.63 (.69)*	-2.03 (.80)**	-1.54 (1.07)
Libertarian-authoritarian			+0.16 (.58)	+0.06 (.63)	+0.25 (.72)	+0.83 (.94)
Rationalist calculations				+2.48 (.40)***	+1.02 (.49)*	+1.15 (.64) ^a
Support for sovereignty					+2.37 (.35)***	+2.38 (.44)***
Constant	+0.75 (.68)	+0.48 (.71)	-0.88 (.98)	-0.33 (1.06)	+0.04 (1.22)	+1.69 (1.89)
Pseudo R ²	.08	.11	.31	.36	.43	.65
LR ChiSq.	80.05***	109.83***	309.19***	354.55***	420.96***	636.94***
Number of cases	463	462	448	448	447	446

Note: The models were estimated using conditional logistic regression. The numbers shown in parentheses are the standard errors. The coefficients for the choice-specific (leader) variables are reported in the text.

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ^a p<.10

Appendix A2: Factors Affecting the Odds of Voting for the Bloc versus the Progressive Conservative Party

	Social Structure	Relative Deprivation	Identities & Values	Rationalist Calculations	Constitutional Preferences	Leaders
Female	+0.14 (.25)	+0.10 (.25)	-0.08 (.29)	-0.18 (.30)	-0.19 (.33)	-0.33 (.44)
Age	-0.02 (.01)**	-0.02 (.01)*	-0.02 (.01)*	-0.02 (.01)	-0.02 (.01)	-0.01 (.02)
Education	+0.03 (.14)	+0.06 (.15)	+0.07 (.17)	+0.05 (.18)	-0.03 (.20)	+0.13 (.27)
Income	-0.10 (.05) ^a	-0.09 (.05) ^a	-0.07 (.06)	-0.05(.06)	-0.09 (.07)	-0.07 (.08)
Working class	-0.43 (.40)	-0.46 (.40)	-0.43 (.47)	-0.50 (.49)	-0.42 (.53)	-0.16 (.69)
Routine	-0.21 (.40)	-0.25 (.40)	-0.23 (.46)	-0.07 (.47)	-0.13 (.51)	-0.08 (.66)
Petit bourgeois	+0.13 (.92)	+0.01 (.93)	+1.05 (1.02)	+0.51 (1.01)	+1.06 (1.26)	+1.62 (1.48)
No code	+0.22 (.38)	+0.18 (.38)	+0.34 (.44)	+0.12 (.45)	+0.08 (.48)	+0.38 (.66)
Union household	+0.61 (.26)*	+0.61 (.26)*	+0.41 (.29)	+0.34 (.30)	+0.36 (.33)	+0.17 (.46)
No religion	-0.45 (.51)	-0.50 (.52)	-0.49 (.58)	-0.70 (.59)	-0.77 (.62)	-1.22 (.85)
Relative deprivation		-0.59 (.31) ^a	-0.48 (.36)	-0.34 (.38)	-0.52 (.40)	-0.77 (.56)
Quebec identity			+5.57 (.85)***	+4.01 (.81)***	+2.25 (.82)**	+2.12 (1.10)**
Left-right			-1.49 (.59)**	-1.53 (.63)*	-1.89 (.72)**	-1.29 (.92)
Libertarian-authoritarian			+0.41 (.54)	+0.31 (.58)	+0.42 (.63)	+0.58 (.84)
Rationalist calculations				+1.65 (.36)***	+0.65 (.43)	+0.26 (.66)
Support for sovereignty					+1.55 (.28)***	+1.24 (.36)***
Constant	+1.82 (.77)*	+1.77 (.77)*	+0.58 (.93)	+0.83 (.96)	+0.93 (1.06)	+4.43 (1.70)**
Pseudo R ²	.08	.11	.31	.36	.43	.65
LR ChiSq.	80.05***	109.83***	309.19***	354.55***	420.96***	639.94***
Number of cases	463	462	448	448	447	446

Note: The models were estimated using conditional logistic regression. The numbers shown in parentheses are the standard errors. The coefficients for the choice-specific (leader) variables are reported in the text.

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ^a p<.10

Appendix A3: Factors Affecting the Odds of Voting for the SNP versus the Labour Party

	Social Structure	Relative Deprivation	Identities & Values	Rationalist Calculations	Constitutional Preferences	Leaders
Female	-0.32 (.26)	-0.37 (.26)	-0.06 (.30)	-0.03 (.30)	+0.00 (.33)	+0.06 (.40)
Age	+0.00 (.01)	+0.00 (.01)	+0.01 (.01)	+0.01 (.01)	+0.02 (.01)	+0.02 (.01)
Education	+0.05 (.15)	+0.07 (.15)	+0.04 (.18)	+0.01 (.18)	+0.02 (.20)	-0.09 (.24)
Income	+0.01 (.03)	+0.01 (.03)	+0.03 (.04)	+0.03 (.04)	+0.02 (.04)	+0.05 (.05)
Working class	-0.44 (.37)	-0.51 (.38)	-0.47 (.44)	-0.46 (.44)	-0.54 (.48)	-0.99 (.60) ^a
Foreman/woman	-0.34 (.48)	-0.45 (.48)	-0.33 (.54)	-0.31 (.54)	-0.42 (.60)	-0.84 (.71)
Routine	-0.31 (.39)	-0.33 (.39)	-0.51 (.44)	-0.48 (.44)	-0.29 (.47)	-0.50 (.56)
Petit bourgeois	+0.27 (.64)	+0.32 (.64)	-0.36 (.75)	-0.12 (.76)	+0.28 (.82)	-0.09 (1.12)
No code	-0.84 (.70)	-0.87 (.70)	-1.03 (.74)	-1.16 (.74)	-1.52 (.81) ^a	-3.00 (1.08) ^{**}
Public Housing	+0.23 (.28)	+0.27 (.28)	+0.41 (.33)	+0.34 (.33)	+0.12 (.36)	+0.63 (.44)
Union household	-0.20 (.25)	-0.22 (.26)	-0.26 (.29)	-0.22 (.30)	-0.10 (.32)	-0.58 (.40)
Catholic	-1.42 (.45) ^{**}	-1.50 (.45) ^{***}	-1.07 (.48) [*]	-1.09 (.48) [*]	-1.03 (.52) [*]	-0.58 (.59)
No religion	+0.02 (.27)	+0.01 (.27)	+0.06 (.32)	+0.15 (.33)	-0.01 (.35)	-0.36 (.45)
Relative deprivation		+0.47 (.26) ^a	+0.66 (.31) [*]	+0.64 (.31) [*]	+0.68 (.34) [*]	+0.57 (.41)
Scottish identity			+0.49 (.30)	+0.24 (.31)	+0.01 (.33)	-0.48 (.44)
Left-right			+1.71 (.56) ^{**}	+1.91 (.57) ^{***}	+2.04 (.61) ^{***}	+1.75 (.74) [*]
Libertarian-authoritarian			-0.86 (.55)	-0.76 (.56)	-0.55 (.58)	-0.44 (.71)
Working class identity			-0.19 (.29)	-0.22 (.29)	-0.21 (.31)	-0.64 (.40)
Rationalist calculations				+1.04 (.36) ^{**}	+0.44 (.39)	+0.56 (.47)
Constitutional change					+1.93 (.35) ^{***}	+1.58 (.42) ^{***}
Constant	-0.78 (.82)	-0.89 (.83)	-1.06 (.95)	-1.29 (.97)	-1.29 (1.04)	-0.49 (1.25)
Pseudo R ²	.26	.28	.34	.36	.41	.56
LR ChiSq.	412.13 ^{***}	448.44 ^{***}	432.39 ^{***}	455.40 ^{***}	512.35 ^{***}	642.18 ^{***}
Number of cases	569	564	462	462	449	411

Note: The models were estimated using conditional logistic regression. The numbers shown in parentheses are the standard errors. The coefficients for the choice-specific (leader) variables are reported in the text.

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ^a p<.10

Appendix A4: Factors Affecting the Odds of Voting for the SNP versus the Conservative Party

	Social Structure	Relative Deprivation	Identities & Values	Rationalist Calculations	Constitutional Preferences	Leaders
Female	-0.24 (.36)	-0.54 (.38)	-0.61 (.49)	-0.43 (.51)	-0.28 (.57)	-0.29 (.68)
Age	-0.03 (.01)**	-0.03 (.01)*	-0.01 (.02)	-0.00 (.02)	+0.00 (.02)	+0.01 (.02)
Education	-0.20 (.20)	-0.14 (.20)	-0.33 (.27)	-0.39 (.28)	-0.10 (.32)	-0.18 (.37)
Income	-0.06 (.04)	-0.04 (.04)	-0.01 (.06)	-0.01 (.06)	-0.02 (.07)	-0.04 (.08)
Working class	+2.27 (.78)**	+2.12 (.79)**	+1.24 (.99)	+0.97 (.99)	+1.11 (1.04)	+1.50 (1.25)
Foreman/woman	+0.34 (.66)	+0.03 (.70)	-1.39 (.90)	-1.47 (.94)	-2.08 (1.02)*	-2.11 (1.16) ^a
Routine	+0.51 (.51)	+0.45 (.53)	+0.01 (.64)	-0.26 (.68)	+0.35 (.77)	-0.33 (.88)
Petit bourgeois	+0.01 (.68)	+0.17 (.70)	-0.20 (1.03)	-0.02 (1.07)	+1.45 (1.31)	+1.58 (1.53)
No code	-1.56 (.81)*	-1.45 (.82) ^a	+0.50 (1.32)	-0.03 (1.37)	-0.48 (1.50)	-1.02 (1.96)
Public Housing	+2.21 (.69)***	+2.22 (.69)***	+2.26 (.92)**	+2.12 (.95)*	+2.44 (1.03)*	+3.07 (1.34)*
Union household	+0.90 (.40)*	+0.87 (.41)	+1.00 (.52)*	+0.96 (.54) ^a	+1.24 (.58)*	+0.86 (.66)
Catholic	-0.21 (.71)	-0.42 (.74)	+0.67 (1.29)	+0.50 (1.27)	-0.12 (1.22)	-0.40 (1.35)
No religion	+0.53 (.41)	+0.60 (.42)	-0.02 (.55)	-0.06 (.57)	-0.13 (.64)	-0.95 (.80)
Relative deprivation		+2.22 (.42)***	+1.80 (.56)***	+1.76 (.57)**	+2.15 (.64)***	+1.75 (.81)*
Scottish identity			+1.20 (.45)**	+0.68 (.48)	+0.49 (.52)	-0.30 (.64)
Left-right			-3.43 (.87)***	-2.80 (.91)**	-2.54 (1.02)**	-0.84 (1.23)
Libertarian-authoritarian			-2.98 (.89)***	-2.62 (.92)**	-1.74 (1.03) ^a	-2.31 (1.19)*
Working class identity			+0.37 (.56)	+0.25 (.59)	+0.34 (.64)	+0.04 (.77)
Rationalist calculations				+2.24 (.55)***	+0.68 (.64)	+0.84 (.72)
Constitutional change					+3.86 (.59)***	+2.76 (.66)***
Constant	+1.76 (1.12)	+1.52 (1.18)	+0.69 (1.50)	+0.65 (1.60)	+0.12 (1.77)	+0.84 (2.02)
Pseudo R ²	.26	.28	.34	.36	.41	.56
LR ChiSq.	412.13***	448.44***	432.39***	455.40***	512.35***	642.18***
Number of cases	569	564	462	462	449	411

Note: The models were estimated using conditional logistic regression. The numbers shown in parentheses are the standard errors. The coefficients for the choice-specific (leader) variables are reported in the text.

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ^a p<.10

Appendix A5: Factors Affecting the Odds of Voting for the SNP versus the Liberal Democratic Party

	Social Structure	Relative Deprivation	Identities & Values	Rationalist Calculations	Constitutional Preferences	Leaders
Female	-0.72 (.34) [*]	-0.89 (.35) ^{**}	-0.70 (.39) ^a	-0.63 (.40)	-0.49 (.43)	-0.27 (.53)
Age	-0.02 (.01) ^a	-0.02 (.01) ^a	-0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)	+0.00 (.01)	-0.00 (.02)
Education	-0.54 (.19) ^{**}	-0.48 (.20) ^{**}	-0.67 (.23) ^{**}	-0.69 (.24) ^{**}	-0.70 (.26) ^{**}	-0.92 (.33) ^{**}
Income	-0.04 (.04)	-0.03 (.04)	+0.03 (.05)	+0.03 (.05)	+0.03 (.05)	+0.05 (.06)
Working class	-0.15 (.48)	-0.22 (.49)	-0.63 (.57)	-0.62 (.59)	-0.75 (.62)	-1.56 (.77) [*]
Foreman/woman	-0.12 (.65)	-0.31 (.66)	-0.62 (.74)	-0.63 (.76)	-0.64 (.83)	-1.07 (.98)
Routine	+0.06 (.48)	+0.04 (.48)	-0.25 (.53)	-0.30 (.54)	-0.13 (.58)	-0.61 (.72)
Petit bourgeois	+0.18 (.78)	+0.34 (.78)	+0.27 (1.03)	+0.51 (1.05)	+0.00 (.58)	+0.00 (.91)
No code	-0.01 (1.01)	+0.03 (1.02)	-0.11 (1.06)	-0.40 (1.08)	-0.81 (1.13)	-1.55 (1.36)
Public Housing	+0.74 (.43) ^a	+0.85 (.43) [*]	+1.37 (.52) ^{**}	+1.25 (.53) [*]	+0.90 (.56)	+1.20 (.68) ^a
Union household	+0.15 (.33)	+0.10 (.34)	+0.13 (.38)	+0.16 (.39)	+0.27 (.41)	-0.10 (.50)
Catholic	+0.22 (.68)	+0.03 (.68)	+0.03 (.72)	-0.08 (.72)	-0.21 (.76)	+0.06 (.84)
No religion	+0.28 (.36)	+0.30 (.36)	+0.08 (.42)	+0.13 (.43)	-0.11 (.46)	-0.45 (.59)
Relative deprivation		+1.30 (.36) ^{***}	+1.35 (.43) ^{**}	+1.34 (.44) ^{**}	+1.23 (.48) ^{**}	+0.83 (.61)
Scottish identity			+0.81 (.38) [*]	+0.41 (.40)	+0.26 (.42)	-0.26 (.56)
Left-right			+0.18 (.70)	+0.66 (.73)	+0.64 (.77)	+0.20 (.97)
Libertarian-authoritarian			-1.51 (.73) [*]	-1.27 (.75) ^a	-1.11 (.80)	-2.16 (.99) [*]
Working class identity			+0.44 (.41)	+0.35 (.41)	+0.39 (.44)	+0.34 (.57)
Rationalist calculations				+1.80 (.46) ^{***}	+1.19 (.50) [*]	+1.34 (.62) [*]
Constitutional change					+2.14 (.45) ^{***}	+1.52 (.55) ^{**}
Constant	+2.77 (1.10) ^{**}	+2.46 (1.10) [*]	+1.76 (1.24)	+1.34 (1.29)	+1.30 (1.36)	+3.38 (1.75) [*]
Pseudo R ²	.26	.28	.34	.36	.41	.56
LR ChiSq.	412.13 ^{***}	448.44 ^{***}	432.39 ^{***}	455.40 ^{***}	512.35 ^{***}	642.18 ^{***}
Number of cases	569	564	462	462	449	441

Note: The models were estimated using conditional logistic regression. The numbers shown in parentheses are the standard errors. The coefficients for the choice-specific (leader) variables are reported in the text.

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ^a p<.10

Appendix B: Question Wording

Scotland

Relative Deprivation

Compared with other parts of Britain since the last general election in April 1992, would you say that Scotland has been getting more prosperous than average, stayed about average, or been getting less prosperous than average? (If more/less prosperous) a lot more/less prosperous or a little? (1 = a lot less prosperous than average)

Scottish Identity

Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself? Scottish not British, more Scottish than British, equally Scottish and British, more British than Scottish, British not Scottish? (1 = Scottish not British)

Left-Right Scale (Coefficient Alpha = .68)

1. Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth (1 = agree strongly)
2. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor (1 = disagree strongly)
3. There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employee's working conditions and wages (1 = agree strongly)
4. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems (1 = agree strongly)
5. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership (1 = disagree strongly)
6. It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (1 = disagree strongly)

Libertarian-Authoritarian Scale (Coefficient Alpha = .56)

1. Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British attitudes (1 = agree strongly)
2. Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards (1 = agree strongly)
3. People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against government (1 = disagree strongly)
4. Homosexual relations are always wrong (1 = agree strongly)
5. People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives (1 = disagree strongly)
6. Political parties which wish to overthrow democracy should be allowed to stand in general elections (1 = disagree strongly)

Working Class Identity

Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to any particular class? (If yes) which class is that? (1 = yes, working class)

Rationalist Calculations

As a result of this Scottish parliament, would Scotland's economy become better, worse or would it make no difference? (If better or worse) is that a lot better/worse or a little better/worse? (1 = a lot better)

Constitutional Preferences

An issue in Scotland is the question of an elected parliament – a special parliament for Scotland dealing with Scottish affairs. Which of these statements comes closest to your view: Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union; Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union; Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers; Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers; Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament? (1 = Scotland should become independent)

Leader Ratings

And now, again using the scale from 0 to 10, please show how much you like or dislike each of these party leaders who stood at the last general election (1 =strongly like)

Quebec

Relative Deprivation

Over the past year, has Canada's economy gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same? And what about the economy of Quebec? Would you say that over the past year Quebec's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? The measure of relative deprivation is the difference between the evaluation of the Quebec economy and the evaluation of the Canadian economy (1 = Quebec economy did worse than the Canadian economy)

Quebec Identity

How do you feel about Canada (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means you really dislike Canada and 100 means you really like Canada)? How do you feel about Quebec (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means you really dislike Quebec and 100 means you really like Quebec)? The measure of Quebec identity is the difference between feeling about Quebec and feeling about Canada.

Left-Right Scale (Coefficient Alpha = .58)

1. The government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs (1 = strongly agree)
2. When businesses make a lot of money, everyone benefits, including the poor (1 = strongly agree)
3. People who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system (1 = strongly agree)
4. How do you feel about unions? (1 = really dislike)
5. (If you HAD to make cuts) would you cut welfare spending a lot, some, or not at all? (1 = a lot)

6. (If you HAD to make cuts) would you cut pensions a lot, some, or not at all? (1 = a lot)
7. (If you HAD to make cuts) would you cut unemployment insurance a lot, some, or not at all? (1 = a lot)
8. (If you HAD to make cuts) would you cut health care a lot, some, or not at all? (1 = a lot)
9. (If you HAD to make cuts) would you cut education a lot, some, or not at all? (1 = a lot)

Libertarian-Authoritarian Scale (Coefficient Alpha = .59)

1. Only people who are married should be having children (1 = strongly agree)
2. Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children (1 = agree strongly)
3. How do you feel about gays and lesbians? (1 = really dislike)
4. How do you feel about feminists? (1 = really dislike)
5. How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples? (1 = really dislike)
6. How do you feel about racial minorities? (1 = really dislike)

Working Class Identity (not asked)

Rationalist Calculations

If Quebec separates from Canada, do you think your standard of living will get better, get worse, or stay about the same as now? (If better/worse) a lot better/worse or a little better/worse? (1 = a lot better)

Constitutional Preferences

Are you very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to Quebec sovereignty, that is, Quebec is no longer a part of Canada? (1 = very favourable)

Leader Ratings

Now we're going to ask you how you feel about the party leaders using a scale from 0 to 100. 0 means you really dislike the leader and 100 means you really like the leader. You can use any number from 0 to 100. How do you feel about [name of leader, in randomized order] (1 = over 95)

Endnotes

¹ As SurrIDGE and Her colleagues (1999, endnote 4) caution, there can be no certainty as to which is the prior variable when we are dealing with identities, cost-benefit calculations, constitutional preferences and even vote choice. We would argue, however, that our chosen ordering does have some warrant in the literature. SurrIDGE and her colleagues, for example, also opt to treat identity as prior to constitutional preference and constitutional preference as prior to vote choice. For an interesting discussion of possible rationalizations effects in the case of support for Quebec sovereignty, see Howe (1998).

² This is because multinomial logisitic regression uses all of the data, as opposed to only that portion of the data that is relevant to a given pairwise comparison. As a result, the coefficients estimated via a series of binomial logistic regressions will not be identical, though they will be very close.

³ The Scottish Election Study involved an over-sample of Scottish respondents as part of the 1997 British Election Study post-election cross-section survey. Approximately 40 questions of special reference to Scotland were added to the survey. A total of 882 interviews were completed. The study consisted of face-to-face interviews, with a self-completion supplement.

⁴ The 1997 Canadian Election Study consisted of a rolling cross section campaign survey and a post-election survey. 1,034 Quebec respondents were interviewed during the campaign, of whom 801 (54%) also completed the post-election survey. Both surveys were conducted by telephone, with random digit dialling used to select the campaign respondents. A corrective weight has been applied to adjust for over-representation of one-person households and under-representation of larger households.

⁵ The education variable was recoded into four roughly equivalent categories: completed university; A level (Scotland) and/or some college (Scotland and Quebec); O level (Scotland) or Diploma of Secondary Studies (Quebec); no O levels (Scotland) or did not complete secondary school (Quebec). Note that secondary education ends in Grade 11 in Quebec. The equivalent of A levels would be completing the two-year pre-university programme in CEGEP.

⁶ The construction of the Quebec scales was guided by Andersen and Heath (2000). However, to enhance comparability, we have substituted an item on trade unions for one referring to social programmes and the deficit (which seems to capture current policy debates rather than core beliefs) in the left-right scale and feelings about feminists for feelings about people on welfare in the libertarian-authoritarian scale. Both substitutions result in slightly better reliability for the francophone Quebec sample.

⁷ Studies of SNP voting suggest that it might have been preferable to have a measure that referred to the collectivity as opposed to the respondent's own situation (Mughan and McAllister 1981; Brand, Mitchell and SurrIDGE 1994; Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997). The Scottish evidence suggests that it is the sociotropic, as opposed to the egocentric, motivation that differentiates SNP voters. If this pattern applies to Quebec, the use of an egocentric measure may understate the importance of rationalist calculations.

⁸ The meaning of sovereignty has to be spelled out in the Quebec case because that meaning has been contested (see Blais and Nadeau 1992). Indeed, part of the rhetoric in both referendum campaigns revolved around the definition—and implications--of the term.