

MAKING SENSE OF REGIONAL VOTING IN THE 1997 FEDERAL ELECTION:  
LIBERAL AND REFORM SUPPORT OUTSIDE QUEBEC\*

ELISABETH GIDENGIL *McGill University*  
ANDRÉBLAIS *Université de Montréal*  
RICHARD NADEAU *Université de Montréal*  
NEIL NEVITTE *University of Toronto*

Published in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, 32: 247-272 (1999)

## **Abstract**

This article uses a regression decomposition approach to explore the meaning of the gaps in Liberal support between Ontario, the West and Atlantic Canada, as well as the gap in Reform support between the West and Ontario. The analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage involves determining whether the regional vote gaps reflect "true" regional differences or whether they can be explained simply in terms of differences in the sociodemographic makeup of the regions. Having ascertained that the gaps are not spurious, the second stage of the analysis probes the beliefs and attitudes that underlie them. It turns out that the gaps are driven not just by differences in political orientations and beliefs from one region to another, but also by more fundamental differences in basic political priorities.

## Introduction

The most critical feature of the 1997 Canadian federal election was the regionalization of the vote. The Liberal Party dominated Ontario, winning 101 of the province's 103 seats and attracting the support of half (50%) the province's voters. Its closest contenders--the Reform Party and the Progressive Conservative Party--trailed by over 30 percentage points with 19 per cent apiece. The picture was dramatically different in Atlantic Canada, where the Liberals ran neck and neck with their traditional rivals, the Progressive Conservatives (34%), and in the West, where they finished almost 15 percentage points behind Reform (43%). The Liberals ended up winning the election with the support of only one Atlantic Canadian (33%) in three and barely more than one Westerner in four (28%).

The basic facts of regional voting are well known. Much less clear is what they mean. Understanding these voting gaps is crucial to any assessment of the implications of the 1997 election for the Canadian political process. At the beginning of the decade, the regionalization of the vote in Canada was already stronger than in other advanced democracies, with the exception of Belgium and Britain,<sup>1</sup> and in 1997 the vote became more strongly regionalized still. Of all the social background characteristics, region of residence turns out to be the strongest single predictor of the vote.<sup>2</sup> This level of regionalization raises profound questions about representation.<sup>3</sup> It is no longer simply a matter of regional underrepresentation in the caucus of the governing party and in the cabinet, which is serious enough; the federal elections of 1993 and 1997 fuelled a renewed concern about the representativeness of the Official Opposition. So why did the Liberals fare so much worse in Atlantic Canada and the West in the 1997 election? And why was the Reform Party so much more successful in the West?<sup>4</sup>

This article employs a two-stage approach to explore the meaning of these regional differences. First we check whether the differences are "real" by making sure that they are not just masking the effects of other social background characteristics that differentiate the regions. Then we go on to ascertain their meaning by probing the orientations and attitudes that underlie them.

### **Understanding Regional Differences**

The bases of regional support in Canada have received little sustained attention from survey researchers since the groundbreaking studies of the 1970s.<sup>5</sup> As a result, regions remain very much "empty containers."<sup>6</sup> The key insight that emerged from the early work was that regional differences could reflect two quite different phenomena, only one of which should properly be considered regional.<sup>7</sup> The region-as-artifact thesis raised the possibility that regional differences are spurious. If regional differences in political preferences can be explained by differences in the regions' social composition, we would be loathe to characterize them as "truly" regional.<sup>8</sup> After all, they imply that people belonging to similar social categories share the same basic political orientations, *regardless* of region of residence. "True" regional differences are present when people belonging to the *same* social categories manifest *different* political preferences from one region of the country to another.

The question then becomes why. The answer is likely to differ depending on which regional gaps we are considering. The Atlantic-Ontario gap in Liberal voting, for example, may well reflect factors that are particular to the 1997 election. After all, in the 1993 election, the Liberals had actually received a higher vote share in the Atlantic region (57%) than they did in Ontario (53%). In the space

of a single election, a surplus of four percentage points had turned into a deficit of nearly 17 percentage points. What had changed?

The most likely candidate is the Liberals' record in office. The Liberals had come to power in 1993 on promises of job creation and the protection of social programmes. The unemployment rate did go down during their term, from 11 per cent to 9.5 per cent, but given the chronically high rates of unemployment in the Atlantic region and the fact that unemployment had gone down by less than one percentage point, the region's residents might well believe that the Liberals had simply failed to deliver. This was likely to be even more true of their reactions to the Liberals' deficit reduction strategy, dependent as the region is on social transfers. The Liberals had campaigned *against* eliminating the deficit by cutting social spending in 1993, but promptly set about doing just that once they were in power.

The gap in Liberal voting between Ontario and the West, by contrast, barely changed from 1993, and even the Reform gap grew by only six percentage points. This suggests that the most important sources of these gaps may lie outside the immediate electoral context in more enduring lines of cleavage. Certainly, if political culture turns out to be the key, the regional fault lines run deep. This would be the conclusion if the differences in vote choice are found to reflect more fundamental differences in basic values and communal orientations.<sup>9</sup>

Several dimensions of political culture could plausibly explain the vote gaps. First, the West is typically characterized as being more right wing in both economic and social terms than other parts of Canada. If Westerners are more fiscally conservative, and if they do indeed adhere to a more traditional morality, this could help explain why Reform had more appeal in the West than it did in Ontario. A second possibility is that it is not ideology per se but orientations toward Quebec. Western voters have typically shown a greater reluctance to accommodate Quebec and this, too, would benefit Reform at the Liberals' expense. Finally, the crucial orientation may turn out to be a more generalized political malaise. With its populist past, the West may be particularly susceptible to Reform's attacks on politicians and traditional party politics. Reform may also benefit from a perception that the federal government does not treat the Western provinces fairly.

This raises another possibility: that the vote gaps are the legacy of party politics. This will be reflected in differences in partisan climate. By differences in partisan climate we mean differences in the distribution of party identification that cannot be explained in terms of differences in social composition or cultural values. The West, for example, may have many fewer people identifying with the Liberal Party than we would expect, even given the make-up of its population and its political culture. Partisan climate in this sense is a reflection of political history. Liberal dominance has resulted in a close identification between the Liberal Party and the policies of the federal government, and the perceived unfairness of those policies has been embodied in such Liberal initiatives as the National Energy Programme. Part of the explanation for the Liberals' weakness in the West, then, may simply be the consequent lack of a core of loyal supporters.

While we expect the vote gaps between the West and Ontario to reflect these enduring fault lines, the immediate political context should not be overlooked. First, social issues like crime and gun control had been added to the mix, and these may have hurt the Liberals--and helped Reform--in the West. Secondly, voters' strategic calculations may have been shaped by the regional strength of the two parties going into the election. In the prototypical form of strategic voting, voters vote on the basis of the expected outcome in the riding, foregoing a vote for their preferred party in favour of a party with the best chance of defeating a party they strongly dislike.<sup>10</sup> The 1997 federal election opened up the possibility of a new kind of strategic voting. Voters who strongly disliked the Bloc québécois may have voted for the party that they thought had the best chance of unseating the Bloc as the official opposition, and in the West that party was more likely to have been Reform.

All of these potential sources of regional differences in party support can contribute to the observed voting gaps in two distinct ways. First, regional differences in vote choice may reflect differences in the distribution of the various explanatory factors. Westerners may have been more likely to vote Reform, for example, because they are more cynical about the political process. We term this the composition component. Second, vote gaps may result from the differential impact of the various explanatory factors. This is the effects component. In its weak form, only the strength of the correlates varies. Westerners may have been more likely to vote Reform not (or not just) because they are more cynical, but because cynicism had a greater impact on their vote. In its stronger form, the correlates themselves can differ. Cynicism may be the driving force in one region, but it may be views about

accommodating Quebec in another region. In the strongest form of all, the same correlate can have quite opposite effects, motivating a vote for the party in one region and a vote against it in another.

### Analyzing Regional Differences

Kraus's<sup>11</sup> regression decomposition technique is useful for disentangling the factors that contributed to the regional gaps in voting because it enables us to estimate the separate (and combined) impact of regional differences in both levels and effects. Kraus's strategy also avoids the problem of having to assume that one region is the norm against which others should be judged. This problem is not just symbolic: results differ according to which region is selected as the norm. Instead of equating one region's mean to the other's, Kraus's method equates both means to the combined grand mean. Because it employs grand means (and thus takes account of population distribution), his approach can be used even when the regions are of very unequal size.<sup>12</sup>

In Kraus's approach, the composition component represents the amount by which the difference in vote choice between two regions would be reduced (or increased) if both regions had mean values on the given explanatory factor equal to the value of the grand mean for the two regions combined:

$$\text{Composition component: } [(1-p)b_{iA} + pb_{iB}] (X_{iA} - X_{iB})$$

where:  $b_{iA}$  and  $b_{iB}$  are the unstandardized regression coefficients for region A and region B respectively on characteristic<sub>i</sub>

$X_{iA}$  and  $X_{iB}$  are the region A and region B adjusted sample means respectively for characteristic<sub>i</sub> and

$p$  is the population proportion of region A.

Similarly, the effects component represents the amount by which the difference would be reduced (or increased) if a given explanatory factor had the same relevance for both regions, assuming the grand mean value for that characteristic for the two regions combined:

$$\text{Effect component: } [X_{iAB}] (b_{iA} - b_{iB})$$

where:  $b_{iA}$  and  $b_{iB}$  are the unstandardized regression coefficients for region A and region B respectively on characteristic $_i$ .

$X_{iAB}$  is the grand sample mean for region A and region B combined for characteristic $_i$ .

The regressions are run separately for each region. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. The data come from the 1997 Canadian Election Study.<sup>13</sup> The dependent variables are reported vote, coded as binary variables<sup>14</sup> (Liberal/not Liberal; Reform/not Reform) with the named party coded "1". The decomposition technique assumes a theoretically meaningful zero point. Accordingly, socio-demographic characteristics are coded as deviations from the combined region grand mean, while the other explanatory factors are scaled to range from -1 to +1, with zero corresponding to a neutral position.<sup>15</sup> The co-efficient for each explanatory factor is taken from a regression containing only causally prior or concurrent explanatory factors. The method thus provides an estimate of the total effect of each factor, as opposed to only that part of its effect that is not mediated through more causally proximate factors. This is essential if we want to estimate how much a social background characteristic like religion contributes in its own right to the regional gaps in voting (as opposed to only that part not mediated through, say, fundamental values or party identification) . Similarly, adjusted means are used when estimating the composition effect to ensure that each factor is only credited with

that portion of the vote which cannot be attributed to causally prior factors. The adjusted means are the intercepts obtained from equations employing each factor as a dependent variable with all prior explanatory factors entered as predictors. The intercepts thus give the predicted level of each explanatory factor for the average resident of each region assuming neutral political orientations and sociodemographic characteristics equal to the combined region grand mean.

Clearly, the order in which the variables are entered can affect the results. We start with the most distant factors. The various ascriptive characteristics (sex, rural residency, age, religion, and ethnic origin) are entered as a single block, with none considered primordial.<sup>16</sup> Next comes level of education, followed by family situation (traditional marriage and children under 18 years), employment-related characteristics (employed, laid off, public sector employment and union household) and then household income.<sup>17</sup> The various political orientations follow. We start with communal orientations and fundamental values<sup>18</sup> on the grounds that these are the most likely to be directly shaped by voters' sociocultural antecedents. These fundamental orientations are assumed, in turn, to affect voters' partisan identifications. Perceptions of economic conditions, issue positions, judgments of incumbent performance and leader evaluations are then entered in sequence.<sup>19</sup> It seems reasonable to assume that economic perceptions shape positions on issues like taxes, the deficit and social spending, as well as judgments of performance and leader ratings, rather than the reverse, but the causal primacy given to party identification may be more contestable. Given the flexibility of partisan ties<sup>20</sup> for some voters, at least, judgments of party performance, leader evaluations, issue attitudes and/or perceptions of economic conditions may determine party identification. For many voters, though, party attachments

serve as a filter through which more proximate judgments are rendered. Using party identification as measured during the campaign (rather than after the vote) guards against the risk of rationalization. As a recent analysis of vote intentions and party identification in the 1997 campaign concluded, "PID [sic] is not simply the vote in disguise."<sup>21</sup> To minimize the possibility that party identification is just a restatement of vote intention, we count only those who identify "fairly strongly" or "very strongly." The final factor to be entered is clearly the most proximate, namely, voters' strategic calculations.<sup>22</sup> Our approach is conservative: any variable that is statistically significant at the  $p < .05$  level when first entered in either of the regional regressions is retained in the analysis.

## **Findings**

Table 1 presents the answer to our first question: do the regional vote gaps simply reflect differences in the regions' social composition? To derive the answer, it is necessary to focus on the column headed "composition component." The figures presented here give the estimated contribution to the vote gap of regional differences in the distribution of social background characteristics. The contribution is calculated as a proportion and should therefore be multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage point contribution. To use the West-Ontario gap in Reform voting as an example, the fact that the West has a higher proportion of voters of northern European ancestry contributed 1.9 percentage points to the total (24 point) gap. The positive sign indicates that the gap would have been 1.9 percentage points less if both regions had had the same proportion of voters of northern European origin. The total net contribution of each type of characteristic (ascriptive and economic, respectively) is obtained by summing down the column.

[Table 1 about here]

Compositional differences make their largest contribution in explaining the gap in Reform voting between Ontario and the West, but even here the total net contribution of ascriptive and economic characteristics combined is little more than three percentage points (3.6 percentage points minus 0.3 percentage points). Differences in social makeup contribute even less (1.3 percentage points) to the Liberal vote gap between the two regions and effectively nothing (0.2 percentage points) to the Atlantic-Ontario gap in Liberal voting. Indeed, the negative sign for Catholic indicates that the Atlantic-Ontario gap could have been almost 2 percentage points wider but for the fact that Atlantic Canada has a higher proportion of Catholics.

The most striking finding is for economic characteristics and family situation. For all three regional vote gaps, their total contribution is less than one percentage point, and the contribution, such as it is, is negative. In other words, differences in the socio-economic composition of the regions do nothing to explain why the gap in Liberal voting between Ontario and Atlantic Canada is so wide. If economic conditions hold the key to explaining the gap in Liberal voting between Ontario and Atlantic Canada, it is not simply a matter of the relative proportions of the haves and the have nots. Indeed, household income did not even approach conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the equations. To the extent that social composition mattered, the relevant characteristics were religion, ethnicity and urban/rural, depending on which gap we are looking at. Their net contribution is so small, however, that we can reasonably conclude that the voting gaps largely or wholly reflect "true" regional differences. There is scant support, then, for the region-as-artifact thesis.

This conclusion is reinforced by the evidence of the role of region in conditioning the political responses of voters with similar background characteristics. The differences in effects provide ample testimony to the regionally-differentiated impact of social attributes.<sup>23</sup> Rural residency, for example, had much stronger effects in Atlantic Canada and the West than it did in Ontario. The effects of union membership and marital status, on the other hand, were wholly confined to Ontario. It was not just the strength of the effects that varied. Non-European ancestry motivated a vote for the Liberals in Ontario, but against them in Atlantic Canada. The one social background characteristic that proves to be a powerful correlate of the vote, regardless of region, is religion (though even here the strength of the effect varied).

These differential effects suggest that the regional differences are authentic, but they do not get us very far in understanding the vote gaps. Indeed, for the West-Ontario gap in Reform voting, they tell us only why the gap was not wider still. Clearly we need to examine the role of beliefs and perceptions in order to make sense of the differences in vote choice.

#### *The Ontario-Atlantic Gap in Liberal Voting*

Table 2 presents the results for the decomposition of the gap in Liberal voting between Ontario and Atlantic Canada. As we anticipated, factors particular to the 1997 electoral context account for a substantial proportion of the gap, with the key factors being perceptions of economic conditions and evaluations of Liberal performance. These election-specific factors are by no means the whole story, however. There are indications of deeper fault lines.

[Table 2 about here]

Perceptions of economic conditions alone account for almost five percentage points of the total 17-point gap in Liberal voting between the two regions.<sup>24</sup> Paralleling the results for economic characteristics, the differences lie almost wholly in effects. The pattern is striking. For Atlantic Canadians, jobs were clearly paramount. The more concerned Atlantic residents were about the possibility of losing their job, the less likely they were to vote Liberal. This concern did not even approach conventional levels of statistical significance in Ontario, where the story was quite different. It centred on perceptions of the performance of the economy, the key factor being optimism about Canada's economic future. Ontarians were not that much more optimistic, but economic optimism was much more of a factor in their vote.

The contribution of performance evaluations to the voting gap also lay very much (though not wholly) in effects. Residents of the Atlantic region and Ontario did not differ markedly in their judgments, but the impact of those judgments on their vote choice was quite different. The one exception was keeping promises: Residents of Atlantic Canada were even more likely than Ontarians to rate the Liberals poorly on this score. Otherwise, the story was one of differential effects. Protecting social programmes, and especially keeping election promises were the salient dimensions in the Atlantic region, while fighting crime, creating employment and preserving national unity were the relevant considerations in Ontario. Judgments of the Liberals' performance at reducing the deficit had quite opposite (albeit muted) effects in the two regions. Only in Ontario were the Liberals rewarded for their success in reducing the deficit; in the Atlantic region, the perception that the Liberals had succeeded in

deficit reduction may have actually hurt their chances. Also, it was only in Atlantic Canada that the Liberals were punished for failing to fulfill their election promises. These were the two crucial dimensions of evaluation for explaining the voting gap, with judgments of Liberal performance on keeping election promises and on reducing the deficit contributing fully six percentage points. Their impact was somewhat offset, though, by the differential effects of judgments on employment; the salience of these judgments in Ontario combined with the typically negative evaluations to narrow the voting gap.

Other factors made a more modest contribution to the voting gap, and strategic calculations had no effect at all. With Alexa McDonough, a native daughter, at the head of the NDP, we might have expected leadership to be a factor. Atlantic Canadians liked Jean Chretien, leader of the Liberals, less than Ontarians did, but this accounted for little more than one percentage point of the total gap. What is again striking are the differences in priorities between the two regions; insofar as issues mattered it was crime and gun control in Ontario and immigration in Atlantic Canada.

All the factors that were specific to the 1997 federal election together account for over 13 percentage points of the total 17 point gap in Liberal voting between Ontario and Atlantic Canada. This suggests that the gap may lack staying power, but there is evidence of more enduring factors. First, economic perceptions may be transient in that they reflect current economic circumstances, but the differences in the salience of the various dimensions of economic evaluation are rooted in structural differences between the regions, differences which cannot be quickly changed. Second, the seemingly

nonexistent contribution of political culture masks deeper regional differences. The differential effects of beliefs about free enterprise and views on women offset the impact of two significant differences in political culture: Atlantic Canadians are more cynical about the political process and, unlike Ontarians, they believe that the federal government treats their province worse than other provinces.<sup>25</sup> Together, these contributed five percentage points to the total gap. This disaffection with the political process, and particularly the widespread perception of unfair treatment by the federal government, may continue to hurt the Liberals' prospects in the region. Finally, partisan differences made a sizeable contribution to the voting gap -- the dearth of strong Liberal partisans in Atlantic Canada reflects the region's political history.

Much depends on short-term factors, but a weaker core of support leaves the party vulnerable. Our results suggest that the Liberals were particularly vulnerable in Atlantic Canada in the 1997 election. Many Atlantic voters turned away from the Liberal Party between 1993 and 1997, the main reason for this being their record. During their four years in office they had not allayed concerns about jobs and this fuelled a perception that the Liberals did not keep their promises.

#### *The Ontario-West Gap in Reform Voting*

The gap in voting for Reform between Western Canada and Ontario was much more clearly grounded in differences in fundamental values and communal orientations (see Table 3). Indeed, the results provide ample evidence that the Reform voting gap has deep roots. We have already seen that ascriptive characteristics were an important part of the explanation for this, with sex, ethnicity, religious

affiliation and urban/rural accounting for seven of the total gap of 24 percentage points. It is now clear that differences in political ethos make a similar contribution to the gap and that partisan differences were also an important factor.

[Table 3 about here]

Cynicism about the political process was not the key factor. What really mattered were views on Quebec and perceived treatment by the federal government. While the latter was, predictably, almost wholly a matter of Westerners' perceptions of inferior treatment, orientations toward Quebec made most of their contribution to the vote gap through differences in effects. Westerners *are* somewhat less accommodating toward Quebec than their counterparts in central Canada but, far more striking, is how very much more salient a factor this was in their voting. So, too, were attitudes toward outgroups and moral traditionalism, though neither accounts for the difference in the Reform vote. There is also a significant non-finding: Beliefs about free enterprise did not even approach conventional levels of statistical significance for either region and thus do nothing to explain the vote difference.

Partisanship clearly contributed significantly to the voting gap.<sup>26</sup> Reform identifiers were a minority in both regions (hence the negative contribution of effects when combined with the greater salience of party identification in the West), but the fact that there were many more strong Reform identifiers in the West helps account for the higher Reform vote.

The contribution of perceptions of economic conditions and evaluations of Liberal performance was clearly minimal. Other facets of the immediate political context, however, did contribute

significantly to the gap in Reform support. The contribution of issues was confined to differences in effects. Residents of the two regions seemed to give weight to different issues when voting, and the Western vote had more to do with issues than the Ontario did.

The differences demonstrate the strategic difficulties of appealing to the two quite different sets of interests in the two regions. There is a clear pattern: Reform's fiscally conservative agenda of tax cuts and deficit elimination had scant appeal to voters in Ontario. The same was true of its calls for the government to get tough on crime and its opposition to gun control. With the desire for tax cuts being a minority position even in the West, the net result was actually to narrow the gap in Reform voting between the West and Ontario. The key issue in explaining the voting gap was the role of government in job creation. Job creation was simply not an issue in Reform voting in the West. For Ontarians, on the other hand, it was this that kept more of them from voting Reform: voters who believe that governments can and should do something to reduce unemployment were significantly less likely to vote for the party.

Strategic considerations also contributed significantly to the gap in Reform support. Voters were more likely to vote for Reform if they perceived the party to have a good chance of winning in their riding. These voters were concentrated disproportionately in the West. Voters' expectations about Reform forming the official opposition were very similar in the two regions; but voters in Ontario seemed much more concerned than Westerners with blocking the Bloc quebecois. This difference helped keep the gap in Reform support from being even wider.

In any case, the contribution of strategic considerations to the voting gap pales beside that of leadership: Ontario voters simply liked Manning less than Western voters did, relative to other leaders. This contributed six percentage points to the West-Ontario difference in Reform support. With a leader at the head of the party who was less identified with the West, Reform might well have had greater appeal in Ontario.

That Manning's personal popularity was so much lower in Ontario was clearly a critical factor in explaining Reform's lack of success there, but our results suggest that the roots of the gap in Reform support between Ontario and the West go deeper. Views about Quebec have a powerful effect on Westerners' vote, and this works very much to Reform's benefit. So, too, does the high number of Westerners who believe that their province is treated unfairly. Transient factors may offset the impact of these more enduring differences in a given election, but the potential for strongly etched patterns of regional voting remains high. And, of course, transient factors are just as likely to reinforce as to offset this potential, as they did in the 1997 election.

#### *The West-Ontario Gap in Liberal Voting*

Leadership could hardly have played a lesser role in the gap in Liberal voting between Ontario and the West (see Table 4). Strategic considerations simply had no impact on the Liberal vote in either region, and evaluations of the party's performance in office actually kept the gap from being wider still. The Ontario-West gap in Liberal support was very much rooted in more fundamental differences.

[Table 4 about here]

Political culture did not play as much of a role in the gap in Liberal support between Ontario and the West as it did for the Reform gap, but the key findings are similar. Westerners *are* more cynical about politics and this *did* hurt the Liberals, but this was offset by the fact that cynicism had a greater impact on Liberal voting in Ontario. The key dimensions of political culture proved, again, to be views on accommodating Quebec and the province's perceived treatment at the hands of the federal government. The Quebec question was obviously a much more salient factor for Westerners than it was for residents of Ontario: Westerners take a harder line when it comes to accommodating Quebec, and this helped Reform and hurt the Liberals. Similarly, the Liberals' chances in the West were hurt by the widespread perception that the federal government does not play fair when it comes to the way provinces are treated.

The results for partisan climate seem to confirm that the legacy of political history was an important part of the Liberals' lack of success in the West. In contrast to Ontario, they can count on only a small core of loyal supporters in Western Canada. These differences in partisanship account for fully eight percentage points of the Liberal vote gap between Ontario and the West<sup>27</sup> and confirm Blake's contention that "the historical association of particular parties with certain regions" is one of the "principal manifestations of regionalism in Canadian voting behaviour."<sup>28</sup> The Liberals' problems in the West were compounded by perceptions of economic conditions. The differences between Ontario and the West in the effects of these perceptions is quite striking. In contrast to Ontario, the sense that economic good times were just around the corner did not garner them many votes in Western Canada, while the belief that the unemployment rate had not gone down during their time in office hurt them.

Finally, we should note an important non-finding. There is no support here for the view that the differences between Ontario and the West reflect a difference in left-right ideology. Beliefs about free enterprise did not affect the Liberal vote in either region and the issue effects, such as they were, were limited to crime and gun control. The absence of fiscal concerns from the relevant issues for understanding the gap in Liberal support may be testimony to just how far toward the right Canadian politics has shifted.

First and foremost, then, the gap in Liberal voting between Ontario and the West reflects differences in traditional party loyalties. There are very few Westerners who identify strongly with the Liberal Party. The party's difficulties in the West are compounded by widely shared perceptions of unfair treatment at the hands of the federal government and by the salience of the Quebec question (factors that both help Reform). Finally, and in marked contrast to Ontario, the Liberals were unable to capitalize on the perception that the future of the Canadian economy looks brighter.

## **Conclusion**

The differences in voting from one region to another were clearly not spurious. Our analysis shows that the voting gaps reflect "true" regional differences. These differences cannot be explained away by variations in the social makeup of the regions, and there is abundant evidence that voters sharing the same social background characteristics voted differently from one region to another. Perhaps the most striking finding is the extent to which regional populations differ in their basic political priorities. It is not simply that the residents of different regions have different beliefs or differ in their political

judgments, important as these differences are. The impact of region is both more subtle and more profound. It lies in differences in the political agenda from one region of the country to another. This is particularly clear in the results for issue positions and economic perceptions. For Reform voting, in particular, issue priorities were quite different between the West and Ontario. The appeal of Reform's fiscally conservative message was largely confined to Western voters; Ontario voters were preoccupied with the government's role in job creation. Similarly, the future prospects for the Canadian economy were only a factor in Ontario. For Easterners and Westerners, employment concerns took precedence, at least when it came to Liberal voting. This pattern of differential effects is strongest on the Quebec question. Reform did so much better in the West not because Westerners wanted to do a lot less for Quebec but because Quebec was a much more pressing concern. It is these differences in fundamental political priorities that makes the challenge of ensuring effective regional representation so difficult and yet so crucial.

## APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL NOTES ON SCALE CONSTRUCTION

Exploratory factor analyses were used to derive the scales. Each analysis began by casting a wide net, including all items that can directly or indirectly be characterized as basic value orientations and issue positions, respectively. The search was for stable and meaningful structures. Items that did not load onto any dimension (as indicated by factor loadings of less than 0.5) were dropped, and the factor analysis was repeated. Pairwise deletion of missing cases was selected in order to maximize the number of cases retained in the analysis. When the results were checked against other methods of treating missing cases (for example, listwise and substituting means), the same factors re-emerged and each had the same content. Similarly, “don’t know” responses were retained in the analysis and were coded neutral categories. This was done first to maximize the number of cases for subsequent analysis and, second, because “don’t know” responses for some of the items have substantive interpretations. Orthogonal (Varimax) rotation was used in order to sharpen the substantive interpretation of the factor dimensions (Kline 1994). When oblique rotation was applied to the same items to test the robustness of the factor solutions, the original factor structures were unchanged and all of the factors turned out to be robust. Items from the mailback wave of the 1997 Canadian Election Study were added to the factor analyses as a further check on the robustness of the dimensions. Again, all of the originally derived factors remained intact.

For basic values and communal orientations, the factor analysis identified six dimensions, and for issue orientations, the analysis produced four dimensions. For each dimension, an additive scale was created, scaled to run from -1 to +1. Details of scale construction can be obtained from Neil Nevitte.

**ENDNOTES**

\*We are grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their financial support. We would also like to thank Amanda Ng and Tim Sinke for their research assistance.

1. See Table 13.1 in Russell J. Dalton, "Political Cleavages, Issues, and Electoral Change," in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris eds., Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), 325.

2. André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte, "Accounting for the Vote in the 1997 Canadian Election," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, June 1998.

3. R. Kent Weaver, "Improving Representation in the Canadian House of Commons," this JOURNAL 30 (1997), 473-512.

4. The gap in Reform support between the West and Atlantic Canada cannot be examined. Support for Reform was so low in Atlantic Canada that the dependent variable would be too skewed to allow for reliable inferences. The gap in Liberal support between Quebec and Ontario is not susceptible to the analytic approach adopted in this paper. We focus on regional differences in the effects of a common set of explanatory factors, but in Quebec, the most important correlate of vote choice was attitudes about sovereignty. See Blais et al., "Accounting for the Vote." Given the available sample size, we are necessarily ignoring intraregional differences in vote choice.

5. See, for example, William P. Irvine, "Assessing Regional Effects in Data Analysis," this JOURNAL 4 (1971), 21-24; Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Patterns," this JOURNAL 5 (1972), 54-81, and "Constituency Contexts and Canadian Elections: An Exploratory

Study," this JOURNAL 11 (1978), 279-305; and Mildred Schwartz, Politics and Territory (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1974).

6. Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada," this JOURNAL 7 (1974), 397-437.

7. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism," and Irvine, "Assessing Regional Effects." Compare Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar, "Region and Voting in Britain, 1979-87: Territorial Polarization or Artifact?" American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992), 168-99.

8. Compare Simeon and Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures," and McAllister and Studlar, "Region and Voting."

9. Why these differences might exist is beyond the scope of this article, but possible candidates include formative historical events and the cultural baggage of the first significant waves of settlers. See, for example, David V. J. Bell, The Roots of Disunity: A Study of Canadian Political Culture 2nd ed.; (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992); Seymour M. Lipset, Continental Divide (New York: Routledge, 1990); Ian Stewart, "All the King's Horses: The Study of Canadian Political Culture," in Alain-G. Gagnon and James P. Bickerton, eds., Canadian Politics: An Introduction to the Discipline 2nd ed. (Peterborough: Broadview, 1994), 75-92; and Nelson Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," Queen's Quarterly 88 (1981), 298-315.

10. André Blais and Richard Nadeau, "Measuring Strategic Voting," Electoral Studies 15 (1996), 39-52; André Blais, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte, "Voting Strategically Against the Winner: The 1997 Canadian Election," paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago; and Gary Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in

the World's Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

11. Vered Kraus, "Group Differences: The Issue of Decomposition," Quality and Quantity 20 (1986), 181-90.

12. The original solution to the problem of which group to choose as the standard was to use the average of the two groups, but using a mean of means only makes sense when the two groups are of roughly equal size. This is the case, for example, in decomposing gender gaps. See Elisabeth Gidengil, "Economic Man--Social Woman? The Case of the Gender Gap in Support for the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement," Comparative Political Studies 28 (1995), 384-408, and Martin Gilens, "Gender and Support for Reagan: A Comprehensive Model of Presidential Approval," American Journal of Political Science 32 (1988), 19-49. Kraus's reformulation gives identical results when the population groups are the same size.

13. The study consists of a three-wave survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University. The study was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada under its Major Collaborative Research Initiatives Programme and by Elections Canada. The data are available at: [www.isr.yorku.ca/ISR](http://www.isr.yorku.ca/ISR). 3,949 eligible voters were interviewed during the campaign, of whom 3,170 were re-interviewed after the election and 1,727 returned a mailback questionnaire. The campaign survey response rate was 59 per cent. See David A. Northrup, The 1997 Canadian Election Study: Technical Documentation (North York: Institute for Social Research, 1998). The data analyzed here are drawn exclusively from the campaign- and post-election surveys. The relatively small size of the sample in Atlantic Canada has necessitated the use of corrective weights to bring respondents' reported vote into correspondence with the actual vote. Correcting only for oversampling of the

Atlantic provinces, the Liberal vote was underestimated by 5 percentage points. For Ontario, the reported Liberal vote was 1.1 percentage points higher than the true value, while the Reform vote was within 0.5 percentage points of the true value. For the West, the Liberal vote was underestimated by 0.9 percentage points, while the Reform vote was overestimated by 2.8 percentage points.

14. With a binary dependent variable, estimation by maximum likelihood might be preferred, but the results of a decomposition using estimation by MLE would be much more complex and difficult to interpret. Estimation by ordinary least squares will normally give similar results, provided that the aggregate predictions lie outside the .20 to .80. See M. W. Gillespie, "Log-Linear Techniques and the Regression of Dummy Dependent Variables: Further Bases for Comparison," Sociological Methods and Research 6 (1977), 103-22.

15. This represents a theoretically meaningful origin since a neutral position cannot influence vote one way or the other. The neutral position includes respondents who answered "don't know." While this was done partly to conserve sample size, it is defensible on theoretical grounds since a lack of opinion should not move the vote for or against any one party.

16. Age, religion and ethnicity were all converted into a series of dummy variables. For age, the dummies were under 25 years, 25 to 39 years, 50 to 64 years and 65 years or older. For religion, the dummies were Catholic, non-Christian, and none. For ethnicity, the dummies were French, northern European and non-European. The regional numbers for southern and eastern Europeans were too small for meaningful analysis.

17. Education was transformed into two dummy variables, representing university graduates and high school dropouts. Household income was adjusted for household size and transformed into two dummy

variables representing the lowest and highest income quintiles.

18. Scales were used to measure orientations toward outgroups, accommodating Quebec, continentalism, cynicism, free enterprise and moral traditionalism. See the Appendix for details of the factor analysis procedure used to derive these scales. Single items were used for the federal government's treatment of the province (cpsj12) and orientations toward women, which were represented by views about how much should be done for women (pese1). When items from the mailback are included in the factor analysis, the latter item loads on a more general orientations toward women factor.

19. Economic perceptions included retrospective and prospective evaluations of personal finances (cpsc1, cpsc2), Canada's economy (cpsg1, cpsg3a) and the provincial economy (cpsg2, cpsg3b), fear of losing one's job (cpsm8a), and perceived change in the unemployment rate and the future unemployment rate (cpsc5, cpsc6). Based on a factor analysis (see Appendix), four scales were used to measure attitudes toward spending cuts, taxes, deficit reduction and job creation. Single items were included for gun control (pese12), youth crime (cpsj21) and immigration (cpsj18). The dimensions of Liberal performance examined were preserving national unity, reducing the deficit, creating jobs, keeping election promises, fighting crime and protecting social programmes (cpsf10a,b,c,d,f,g). Leader evaluations were the difference between evaluations of the party's leader and the other party leader with the highest evaluation.

20. Lawrence LeDuc, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson and Jon Pammett, "Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence from a New Panel Study," American Political Science Review 71 (1984), 470-84. But see Richard Johnston, "Party Identification Measures in the Anglo-American Democracies: A National

Survey Experiment," American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992), 542-59.

21.Christopher Kam, "Party Identification in Canada: Re-Examining the Concept," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, June 1998, 28.

22.Each party's chances in the riding are expressed as the difference between its expected standardized chances and those of the top contender among the other parties. If the difference is positive, the variable equals 0. Thus the variable is on a scale from -1 to 0. The assumption is that the more the party was perceived to be trailing in the riding, the less likely people would be to vote for it. Chances of forming the official opposition is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the party was perceived to have the best chances of forming the official opposition and 0 otherwise.

23.The contribution of differences in effects can be found in the column headed "effect component."

The figures in that column give the estimated contribution to the vote gap of regional differences in the effects of social background on the vote. The figures should again be multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage point contribution. To take the West-Ontario gap in Reform voting as an example, the fact that rural residence had a much stronger effect on Reform voting in the West contributed 1.3 percentage points to the total gap. The positive sign indicates that the gap would have been 1.3 percentage points less if rural residence had had the same effect in both regions.

24.Our model over explains the gap by .8 percentage points. Obviously, it should be borne in mind that our estimates of the contribution of the various factors are just approximations.

25.It should be noted, however, that the effect of the latter is of borderline statistical significance.

26.It might be objected that the Reform Party is too new for identification to be considered deeply rooted. Reform voters, however, did show impressive levels of loyalty in the 1997 election. See Blais et

al., "Accounting for the Vote." Even if we enter party identification *after* economic perceptions, issue positions, incumbent performance and leader rating--and thus make the unrealistic assumption that any link between these judgments and party identification runs entirely from the former to the latter--a one percentage point contribution remains.

27. Even (unrealistically) entering party identification after economic perceptions, issues, incumbent performance and leader evaluations leaves a net contribution of 4.3 percentage points attributable to party identification alone.

28. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism," 59. The other manifestation was "inconsistencies in the strength or direction of party support on the part of members of the same religious, ethnic, or class group living in different regions," 60.

TABLE 1:  
SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND THE REGIONAL VOTING GAPS

**1. The West-Ontario Gap in Reform Voting**

	Effects West <sub>b</sub>	Effects Ontario <sub>b</sub>	West Adj.Means	Ontario Adj.Means	Grand Means	Composition Component	Effect Component	Total
Male	0,116 (.038)**	0,072 (.033)*	0,037	-0,043	0,505	0,007	0,022	0,030
Northern European ancestry	0,167 (.048)**	0,182 (.054)**	0,054	-0,056	0,169	0,019	-0,003	0,017
Non-European ancestry	-0,164 (.063)**	-0,079 (.050)	-0,002	0,005	0,086	0,001	-0,007	-0,006
Catholic	-0,066 (.045)	-0,097 (.035)**	-0,054	0,064	0,279	0,010	0,009	0,018
Rural residency	0,097 (.048)*	0,037 (.043)	-0,012	0,013	0,209	-0,002	0,013	0,011
<b>Ascriptive Characteristics Total</b>						<b>0,036</b>	<b>0,034</b>	<b>0,069</b>
University graduate	-0,189 (.046)**	-0,094 (.039)*	0,001	-0,002	0,267	0,000	-0,025	-0,026
Traditional marriage	-0,005 (.039)	0,089 (.033)**	-0,007	0,008	0,634	-0,001	-0,060	-0,060
Public sector employment	-0,109 (.042)**	-0,046 (.037)	0,013	-0,007	0,294	-0,002	-0,019	-0,020
<b>Economic Characteristics and Family Situation Total</b>						<b>-0,003</b>	<b>-0,103</b>	<b>-0,106</b>

**2. The Ontario-West Gap in Liberal Voting**

	Effects Ontario <sub>b</sub>	Effects West <sub>b</sub>	Ontario Adj.Means	West Adj.Means	Grand Means	Composition Component	Effect Component	Total
Rural residency	-0,038 (.054)	-0,083 (.042)*	0,013	-0,012	0,209	-0,001	0,009	0,008
Non-European ancestry	0,194 (.063)**	0,248 (.055)**	0,005	-0,002	0,086	0,002	-0,005	-0,003
Catholic	0,202 (.044)**	0,112 (.040)**	0,064	-0,054	0,279	0,019	0,025	0,044
<b>Ascriptive Characteristics Total</b>						<b>0,019</b>	<b>0,030</b>	<b>0,049</b>
University graduate	-0,016 (.050)	0,083 (.041)*	0,000	0,001	0,267	0,000	-0,026	-0,026
Employed	0,119 (.044)**	0,076 (.037)*	-0,033	0,029	0,644	-0,006	0,028	0,022
Public sector employment	0,122 (.048)**	0,032 (.040)	-0,002	0,011	0,294	-0,001	0,026	0,025
Union household	-0,112 (.045)**	-0,004 (.038)	-0,012	0,009	0,368	0,001	-0,040	-0,038
<b>Economic Characteristics and Family Situation Total</b>						<b>-0,006</b>	<b>-0,012</b>	<b>-0,018</b>

TABLE 1:

## SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND THE REGIONAL VOTING GAPS

## 3. The Ontario-Atlantic Gap in Liberal Voting

	Effects Ontario <sub>b</sub>	Effects Atlantic <sub>b</sub>	Ontario Adj.Means	Atlantic Adj.Means	Grand Means	Composition Component	Effect Component	Total
Rural residency	-0,038 (.054)	-0,130 (.060)*	-0,077	0,173	0,299	0,026	0,028	0,053
65 years and older	-0,001 (.061)	0,199 (.093)*	0,010	-0,022	0,145	0,004	-0,029	-0,025
Non-European ancestry	0,194 (.064)**	-0,146 (.172)	0,020	-0,041	0,072	-0,003	0,024	0,022
Catholics	0,202 (.044)***	0,241 (.060)***	-0,024	0,054	0,367	-0,018	-0,014	-0,032
<b>Ascriptive Characteristics Total</b>						<b>0,009</b>	<b>0,009</b>	<b>0,018</b>
Employed	0,131 (.048)**	0,101 (.069)	0,003	0,023	0,614	-0,002	0,018	0,016
Public sector employment	0,109 (.048)*	0,047 (.068)	-0,024	0,045	0,304	-0,005	0,019	0,014
Union household	-0,107 (.045)*	0,001 (.068)	0,000	-0,006	0,364	0,000	-0,039	-0,039
<b>Economic Characteristics and Family Situation Total</b>						<b>-0,007</b>	<b>-0,002</b>	<b>-0,009</b>

\* p<.05    \*\* p<.01    \*\*\* p<.001

Number of cases: Ontario 546 Atlantic Canada 238 West 638

Note: Estimation is by OLS, with pairwise deletion of missing data. The effects are unstandardized regression co-efficients. Numbers shown in parentheses are standard errors.

**TABLE 2:**  
THE ONTARIO-ATLANTIC CANADA GAP IN LIBERAL VOTING

	<b>Effects Ontario<sub>b</sub></b>	<b>Effects Atlantic<sub>b</sub></b>	<b>Ontario Adj.Means</b>	<b>Atlantic Adj.Means</b>	<b>Grand Means</b>	<b>Composition Component</b>	<b>Effect Component</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal Performance:</b>								
Crime	0,076 (.019)***	-0,016 (.030)	0,091	0,172	0,096	-0,001	0,009	0,008
Deficit	0,041 (.020)*	-0,040 (.028)	0,319	0,316	0,360	0,000	0,029	0,029
Jobs	0,054 (.021)**	-0,022 (.032)	-0,423	-0,495	-0,408	0,000	-0,031	-0,031
Programmes	-0,006 (.019)	0,058 (.028)*	-0,025	-0,025	-0,057	0,000	0,004	0,004
Promises	0,021 (.021)	0,073 (.033)*	-0,256	-0,531	-0,292	0,016	0,015	0,031
National Unity	0,053 (.019)**	0,028 (.027)	0,133	0,061	0,184	0,003	0,005	0,007
<b>Liberal Performance Total</b>						<b>0,017</b>	<b>0,030</b>	<b>0,048</b>
<b>Chretien Rating</b>	0,574 (.073)***	0,632 (.095)***	-0,016	-0,035	-0,022	<b>0,012</b>	<b>0,001</b>	<b>0,013</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>						<b>0,117</b>	<b>0,061</b>	<b>0,178</b>

\* p<.05    \*\* p<.01    \*\*\* p<.001

Number of cases: Ontario 546    Atlantic Canada 231

Note: Estimation is by OLS, with pairwise deletion of missing data. The effects are unstandardized regression co-efficients. Numbers shown in parentheses are standard errors.

TABLE 3:  
THE WEST-ONTARIO GAP IN REFORM VOTING

	Effects West <sub>b</sub>	Effects Ontario <sub>b</sub>	West Adj.Means	Ontario Adj.Means	Grand Means	Composition Component	Effect Component	Total
<b>Ascriptive Characteristics Total</b>						<b>0,036</b>	<b>0,034</b>	<b>0,069</b>
<b>Economic Characteristics and Family Situation Total</b>						<b>-0,003</b>	<b>-0,103</b>	<b>-0,106</b>
Orientations toward outgroups	-0,053 (.021)**	-0,026 (.021)	0,052	0,181	0,115	0,005	-0,003	0,002
Accommodating Quebec	-0,162 (.023)***	-0,034 (.021)	-0,257	-0,168	-0,222	0,008	0,028	0,037
Cynicism	0,096 (.028)***	0,094 (.023)***	0,586	0,458	0,532	0,012	0,001	0,013
Moral traditionalism	0,086 (.022)***	0,033 (.020)	-0,280	-0,300	-0,290	0,001	-0,015	-0,014
Orientations toward women	-0,081 (.029)**	-0,092 (.027)***	0,454	0,440	0,445	-0,001	0,005	0,004
Provincial treatment by federal gov't	0,069 (.031)*	0,077 (.025)**	0,352	-0,015	-0,432	0,027	0,003	0,030
<b>Political Culture Total</b>						<b>0,052</b>	<b>0,019</b>	<b>0,072</b>
<b>Partisan Climate</b>	0,323 (.023)***	0,245 (.026)***	-0,301	-0,531	-0,359	<b>0,065</b>	<b>-0,028</b>	<b>0,037</b>
Unemployment--retrospective	-0,025 (.022)	-0,060 (.020)**	-0,169	-0,134	-0,181	0,002	-0,006	-0,005
<b>Perceptions of Economic Conditions Total</b>						<b>0,002</b>	<b>-0,006</b>	<b>-0,005</b>
Taxes	0,049 (.018)**	0,028 (.018)	-0,511	-0,419	-0,508	-0,003	-0,011	-0,014
Deficit reduction	0,049 (.019)**	0,015 (.018)	0,455	0,384	0,347	0,002	0,012	0,014
Job creation	-0,008 (.023)	-0,063 (.024)**	0,539	0,548	0,624	0,000	0,034	0,035
Get tough on crime	0,045 (.017)**	0,014 (.016)	0,232	0,345	0,314	-0,003	0,010	0,007
Gun control	-0,052 (.015)***	-0,029 (.015)	-0,097	0,042	0,076	0,006	-0,002	0,004
<b>Issue Positions Total</b>						<b>0,001</b>	<b>0,043</b>	<b>0,045</b>
Liberal Performance:								
Crime	-0,046 (.017)**	-0,053 (.016)***	-0,076	-0,093	-0,099	-0,001	-0,001	-0,002
Deficit	-0,069 (.016)***	-0,033 (.016)*	0,199	0,337	0,206	0,007	-0,007	-0,001
Programmes	0,037 (.016)*	-0,001 (.016)	0,228	0,042	0,029	0,003	0,001	0,004
National unity	-0,015 (.016)	-0,046 (.016)**	0,032	-0,015	0,067	-0,001	0,002	0,001
<b>Liberal Performance Total</b>						<b>0,008</b>	<b>-0,005</b>	<b>0,003</b>

**TABLE 3:**  
THE WEST-ONTARIO GAP IN REFORM VOTING

	Effects West <sub>b</sub>	Effects Ontario <sub>b</sub>	West Adj.Means	Ontario Adj.Means	Grand Means	Composition Component	Effect Component	Total
<b>Manning Rating</b>	0,516 (.053)***	0,532 (.054)***	0,004	-0,107	-0,123	<b>0,058</b>	<b>0,002</b>	<b>0,060</b>
Reform chances in riding	0,173 (.060)**	0,214 (.049)***	-0,130	-0,302	-0,247	0,034	0,010	0,044
Reform chances Official Opposition	0,061 (.031)*	0,116 (.036)**	0,248	0,232	0,201	0,001	-0,011	-0,010
<b>Strategic Considerations Total</b>						<b>0,035</b>	<b>-0,001</b>	<b>0,034</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>						<b>0,254</b>	<b>-0,044</b>	<b>0,208</b>

\* p<.05    \*\* p<.01    \*\*\* p<.001

Number of cases: West 638    Ontario 546

Note: Estimation is by OLS, with pairwise deletion of missing data. The effects are unstandardized regression co-efficients. Numbers shown in parentheses are standard errors.

TABLE 4:  
THE ONTARIO-WEST GAP IN LIBERAL VOTING

	Effects Ontario <sub>b</sub>	Effects West <sub>b</sub>	Ontario Adj.Means	West Adj.Means	Grand Means	Composition Component	Effect Component	Total
<b>Ascriptive Characteristics Total</b>						<b>0,019</b>	<b>0,030</b>	<b>0,049</b>
<b>Economic Characteristics and Family Situation Total</b>						<b>-0,006</b>	<b>-0,012</b>	<b>-0,018</b>
Accommodating Quebec	-0,023 (.026)	0,097 (.021)***	-0,171	-0,260	-0,222	0,003	0,027	0,030
Cynicism	-0,146 (.030)***	-0,101 (.027)***	0,460	0,586	0,532	0,016	-0,024	-0,008
Provincial treatment by federal gov't.	-0,103 (.032)**	-0,066 (.030)*	-0,022	0,354	0,184	0,032	-0,007	0,026
<b>Political Culture Total</b>						<b>0,051</b>	<b>-0,004</b>	<b>0,047</b>
<b>Partisan Climate</b>	0,312 (.024)***	0,294 (.021)***	0,155	-0,121	-0,103	<b>0,084</b>	<b>-0,002</b>	<b>0,082</b>
Unemployment--retrospective	0,028 (.025)	0,079 (.021)***	-0,123	-0,130	-0,181	0,000	0,009	0,010
Canada's economy--prospective	0,131 (.030)***	0,053 (.025)*	0,465	0,391	0,339	0,007	0,026	0,033
Provincial economy--retrospective	-0,060 (.024)**	-0,022 (.018)	0,208	0,236	0,159	0,001	-0,006	-0,005
<b>Perceptions of Economic Conditions Total</b>						<b>0,009</b>	<b>0,030</b>	<b>0,038</b>
Get tough on crime	0,046 (.020)*	0,030 (.016)	0,253	0,118	0,314	0,005	0,005	0,010
Gun control	0,053 (.018)**	0,039 (.015)**	0,138	0,116	0,076	0,001	0,001	0,002
<b>Issue Positions Total</b>						<b>0,006</b>	<b>0,006</b>	<b>0,012</b>
Liberal Performance:								
Crime	0,075 (.019)***	0,012 (.016)	0,062	0,089	-0,099	-0,001	-0,006	-0,007
Deficit	0,047 (.019)**	0,040 (.016)**	0,392	0,276	0,206	0,005	0,001	0,007
Jobs	0,053 (.020)**	0,037 (.018)*	-0,422	-0,240	-0,426	-0,008	-0,007	-0,015
National unity	0,054 (.019)**	0,041 (.016)**	0,146	0,139	0,067	0,000	0,001	0,001
<b>Liberal Performance Total</b>						<b>-0,004</b>	<b>-0,011</b>	<b>-0,015</b>
<b>Chretien rating</b>	0,570 (.072)***	0,442 (.057)***	-0,017	-0,038	-0,057	<b>0,011</b>	<b>-0,007</b>	<b>0,003</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>						<b>0,169</b>	<b>0,030</b>	<b>0,199</b>

\* p<.05    \*\* p<.01    \*\*\* p<.001

## TABLE 4:

### THE ONTARIO-WEST GAP IN LIBERAL VOTING

Number of cases: Ontario 546 West 638

Note: Estimation is by OLS, with pairwise deletion of missing data. The effects are unstandardized regression co-efficients. Numbers shown in parentheses are standard errors.